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Security Transitions⇤




How do foreign powers disengage from a conflict? We study this issue by exam-
ining the recent, large-scale security transition from international troops to local
forces in the ongoing civil conflict in Afghanistan. We construct a new dataset
that combines information on this transition process with declassified conflict out-
comes and previously unreleased quarterly survey data of residents’ perceptions
of local security. Our empirical design leverages the staggered roll-out of the
transition, and employs a novel instrumental variables approach to estimate the
impact. We find a significant, sharp, and timely decline of insurgent violence in
the initial phase – the security transfer to Afghan forces; we find that this is fol-
lowed by a significant surge in violence in the second phase – the actual physical
withdrawal of foreign troops. We argue that this pattern is consistent with a sig-
naling model, in which the insurgents reduce violence strategically to facilitate the
foreign military withdrawal to capitalize on the reduced foreign military presence
afterwards. Our findings clarify the destabilizing consequences of withdrawal in
one of the costliest conflicts in modern history, and yield potentially actionable
insights for designing future security transitions.
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1 Introduction
Foreign military occupations typically end with a security transition, in which
international forces transfer military and police powers to local allies. Such foreign-
to-local security transitions are difficult to manage (Lake, 2016). This is due to the
likely survival, in one form or another, of anti-government elements that triggered the
foreign military intervention. The matter of who gains or loses power at the end of the
eventual security transition may have significant short- and long-run consequences
for economic and political development. Yet surprisingly little is known about the
conflict dynamics of countries experiencing a foreign-to-local security transition. Our
research addresses this issue by conducting a microlevel study of the impact of the
large-scale security transition that marked the end of Operation Enduring Freedom
in Afghanistan – the long-running military campaign of the North American Treaty
Organization (NATO).
Since 1960, at least 115 foreign military occupations have ended (Collard-Wexler,
2013) (see Online Appendix Figure A1). A substantial percentage of these inter-
ventions involved a security transition with the withdrawal of troops and redeploy-
ment of weaponry to local allies. With a large number of military occupations ac-
tive around the world, security transitions are an important economic and policy
issue. Even though the historical record is riddled with security transitions, nearly
all microlevel empirical research on counterinsurgency focuses on understanding the
economic and political drivers that explain how military interventions begin, and
how conflict strategies and war fighting tactics evolve during an ongoing campaign
(Berman and Matanock, 2015). By contrast, the security transitions that mark the
end foreign military occupations have received less attention. Empirical work on this
topic has naturally been constrained by the lack of consistent conflict data during the
transition period, particularly for unsuccessful transitions. Our paper overcomes this
long-standing constraint by leveraging unique, rich microlevel data collected contin-
uously during the transition process in Afghanistan; these data enable us to address
the knowledge gap around exit strategies after foreign interventions.
Conflict patterns during and after the security transitions that mark the end of a
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foreign intervention or occupation are theoretically ambiguous. A security transition
may shift provision of policing and formal military operations from well-trained and
equipped foreign fighters to unseasoned, local forces armed with outdated technolo-
gies, or equipment with which they are unfamiliar. Even if local fighters are capable,
they may lack legitimacy, inflict unintended harm on civilians, or deliberately dis-
criminate against ethnic rivals – undermining economic welfare and damaging public
confidence in the quality and stability of host-nation institutions. Local forces might
also transfer weaponry and other war fighting capital to unregulated paramilitary
groups (Dube and Naidu, 2015). Under these conditions, insurgents are likely to
increase their operations, and they may consolidate their control over previously con-
tested areas. Furthermore, insurgents may directly and strategically respond to plans
of foreign forces to withdraw troops by changing their underlying tactics and targets
(Bueno de Mesquita, 2013; Wright, 2016; Vanden Eynde, 2018). Security transitions
may be poorly coordinated between foreign and local forces, leading to political and
tactical disorder, and further enhancing tensions. On the other hand, local forces
might be better able to integrate with communities and to extract information from
non-combatants about insurgent operations (Lyall et al., 2015). Local forces may have
greater knowledge than foreign soldiers about the human terrain and difficulties mo-
tivating violence against conationals or coethnics; this understanding could lead to
reduced insurgent activity and increased counterinsurgent effectiveness. Importantly,
there is no existing empirical evidence on the relative significance of these different
mechanisms in the context of security transitions.
To study how security transitions from foreign to local forces influence insurgent
activity and counterinsurgent effectiveness, we examine the large-scale transfer of
policing and military power from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
to host nation forces in Afghanistan at the end of Operation Enduring Freedom. In
2001, international forces displaced the incumbent regime, and assisted in the instal-
lation of an ostensibly democratic government. During the occupation foreign forces,
coordinated under the auspices of NATO, helped train and equip local police and
military forces. Planning for the transition of security provision from ISAF to Afghan
forces began as early as 2010, and was formally announced in 2011. The transition
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was staggered, and coordinated around administrative districts. Over three years, and
five transition tranches, Afghanistan’s districts were transferred from ISAF to Afghan
control.
We estimate the impact of the security transition on conflict dynamics using ex-
ceptionally granular data, which allow us to overcome a core constraint that has ham-
pered quantitative studies of security transitions so far. Since the start of major ISAF
operations, a system to collect comprehensive conflict data from ISAF and host-nation
forces was set up to track significant activities (SIGACTS). These geotagged and time-
stamped event data document dozens of different types of insurgent and security
force operations – representing the most complete catalog of conflict activity dur-
ing Operation Enduring Freedom currently available (Shaver and Wright, 2016). We
secured access to these data through formal declassification channels. We then com-
bined these observational data with microlevel survey data collected by NATO (using
local contractors) through the Afghanistan National Quarterly Assessment Research
(ANQAR) platform. We obtained restricted access to the complete survey records of
around 370,000 individual respondents across dozens of quarterly waves from 2008
to 2016. These surveys include questions measuring perceptions of security condi-
tions, the extent of local security provision, and perceptions of territorial control. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first conflict where detailed combat records
and high frequency survey data can be combined to study a security transition from
foreign to local forces. Using these data in tandem allows us to cross-validate our
findings and to distinguish between potential mechanisms.1
Our empirical analysis sheds light on the two main phases of the security transi-
tion. The first phase is the onset of the transition, marked by a sequence of public
announcements detailing where and when security responsibility is to be handed
over to local forces. The second phase is the actual physical withdrawal and closure
of military bases hosting NATO troops. To estimate the effect of the onset of the secu-
rity transition, we use a difference-in-differences approach. We exploit the staggered
schedule of transition announcements that occurred across five tranches. This allows
1Existing work rarely combines observational and survey data on conflicts; Gould and Klor (2010)
and Jaeger et al. (2015) are notable exceptions. Studying both observational data on conflict events and
survey data on security perceptions side by side, we find consistent patterns across both types of data.
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us to pool evidence from each of the tranches to study the onset and aftermath of
the security transition on conflict outcomes by comparing localities where the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) took over security to those where ISAF was still in
charge. We examine security levels in districts before and after the security transfer.
The geographic precision of our conflict data enables us to employ a high-resolution,
spatial-matching design as an alternative to our district-level analysis. Our results for
this first transfer phase show that the local announcement of the security transition
schedule led to a short-term decline in local violence. This pattern holds both for
conflict measures that are drawn from the SIGACTS database as well for those that
are taken from ANQAR survey instruments measuring the security perceptions of the
local population. This improvement in security outcomes appears to have gone hand
in hand with a substantial upward shift in civilian perceptions of the efficacy of local
security forces.
Our second empirical exercise focuses on the physical withdrawal of NATO troops.
Using a newly constructed dataset of individual base closures and handovers, we
employ an instrumental variables strategy, exploiting operational and logistical con-
straints of the troop withdrawal. Specifically, we exploit cross-sectional variation in
the travel distance between individual districts and the ten major logistical hubs that
had the military-grade airports required to accommodate the cargo airplanes that
transported arms and troops out of the country. This approach helps us to address
concerns about the endogeneity of the sequencing of base closures across different re-
gions. We address potential violations of the exclusion restriction directly by account-
ing for the correlation between logistical constraints and other measures of population
and market proximity. Our findings for this second phase show that violence signifi-
cantly surged, and residents’ perceptions of security plummeted after the departure of
international forces. Overall, the pattern that emerges suggests that the security han-
dover is associated with an improvement in the security situation, while the physical
withdrawal of NATO troops is marked by a dramatic worsening of security.
This pattern is consistent across observational military records of combat activity
and civilian sentiment, and it is robust to a number of alternative model specifications.
We pay particular attention to violations of the non-interference assumption inherent
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in designs in which spatial spillovers or displacement effects are possible. Rather
than invoking conventional spatial models that require the researcher to pre-specify
the extent to which conflict processes interact across space, we leverage the work by
de Paula et al. (2019). We adapt their approach to the specific issue at hand: learning
the pattern of spatial spillovers of conflict, and then using that information to directly
control for the spillovers.
We investigate two plausible mechanisms empirically: withdrawal of foreign tar-
gets, and tactical complementarities. A reduced foreign troop presence and transition
to local forces could have weakened Taliban mobilization due to a change in target
type. While consistent with violence reductions after the first phase, this mechanism
cannot explain the subsequent increase in Taliban attacks after withdrawal. The sub-
sequent increase in violence is also inconsistent with the possibility that foreign troops
were no longer needed to maintain stability, or the possibility that local forces were
adequately prepared to operate independently. On the other hand, the combination
of local operational command and indirect ISAF support could have produced signif-
icant security gains that were then reversed with the physical withdrawal of foreign
troops; a range of empirical tests, however, shows no evidence of such complemen-
tarities between ISAF and the ANSF.
Instead, we argue that the main results are consistent with a third mechanism:
“lying low.” That is, insurgents strategically and temporarily draw down their forces,
in effect lying low until after counterinsurgents have sufficiently raised the cost of local
re-intervention. While our primary contribution is to provide a first empirical record
of an important security transition, we use a simple model to situate the observed
patterns. NATO cannot directly observe the local capacity of the Taliban relative to
the ANSF; thus, NATO bases its decision to physically withdraw troops on observed
levels of violence during the transition period. A high-capacity Taliban can then
decide to pursue a strategy of lying low as part of a pooling equilibrium, which
facilitates the withdrawal of ISAF, and increases the ability of the Taliban to inflict
violence when the transition is completed.
We contribute to several strands of literature in economics and political science.
Prior work in economics has investigated the causes of civil conflict (Fearon and
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Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Berman et al., 2017;
Limodio, 2019; Manacorda and Tesei, 2020), and examined development interven-
tions that occur during ongoing insurgencies (Berman et al., 2011; Fetzer, 2020; Beath
et al., 2013; Crost and Johnston, 2014; Sexton, 2016). Seminal theoretical work has
highlighted the role of state capacity in shaping conflict dynamics, including the end
of war (Wittman, 1979; Werner, 1999; Besley, Timothy; Persson et al., 2010; Padró i
Miquel and Yared, 2012; Powell, 2013; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; Esteban et al., 2015).
Other studies have focused on war fighting directly, exploring the effectiveness of var-
ious government tactics (Lyall, 2009; Dell and Querubin, 2018) and the use of violence
by insurgents (König et al., 2017; Condra et al., 2018). We advance this literature with
the first exploration of conflict dynamics during a large-scale, foreign-to-local security
transition.
Our study also yields potentially actionable insights regarding one of the costliest
conflicts in modern history. Since 2001, the United States alone has invested $1.07 tril-
lion in combat operations, economic assistance, and soldier healthcare – all directly
related to the war in Afghanistan. The human toll of the war was also substantial; by
2018, ISAF had lost 3,547 soldiers in combat operations, and at least 31,000 civilian
deaths had also been documented. The security transition marked a turning point in
the conflict, and it has been the subject of fierce political debates at all its stages – when
it was announced, when it was implemented, and after it had been completed. The
evidence we present demonstrates how the withdrawal of foreign forces influenced
the stability of local political actors and institutions. It suggests how future transi-
tions, including other NATO troop drawdowns, might be managed more effectively
– addressing a significant gap in our understanding of a topic of immense economic
and policy significance. More broadly, this study reinforces the importance of data
collection and dissemination during and after armed conflict. Rigorously evaluating
government interventions, especially force transitions, requires careful, ongoing mea-
surement of local conditions and a commitment to making data, like the combat and
survey records we study here, available for research.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background context on the
security transition in Afghanistan, and describes the data used in this investigation.
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Section 3 reviews the empirical strategies we employ. Section 4 presents the main
results. Section 5 discusses the mechanisms that could explain our findings, providing
a simple conceptual framework as well as discussing the external validity. Section 6
concludes.
2 Context and Data
2.1 Timing of the security transition
The war in Afghanistan led a large number of NATO countries to participate in
ground operations under the umbrella of ISAF. According to United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1386, ISAF’s role was explicitly to assist the Afghan Interim
Authority in rebuilding government institutions and providing security. From its in-
ception, the mission was conceived as a temporary intervention. First steps toward a
security transition were taken in November 2009, when then-President Hamid Karzai
announced the desire to see a complete transition by the end of 2014. The United
States subsequently announced that the transition process would begin in 2011. In
July 2010, the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) was established to imple-
ment the transition process. JANIB selected a first tranche of districts for which the
ANSF took over security, and President Karzai announced these districts in March
2011. The process was completed in five tranches, with an official transition cere-
mony to mark the completion of the transfer at the end of 2014. These events are
depicted on a timeline in Figure 1. The official transfer of security responsibility is the
first phase of the broader transition process, with ISAF base closures and the ultimate
physical withdrawal of ISAF troops as the second phase. The next subsections discuss
these two transition phases in detail.
2.2 Security transfer: assignment to transition tranches
In November 2010, JANIB convened for the first time. Under the leadership of
Dr. Ashraf Ghani (appointed by President Karzai as the Chairman of the Afghan
Transition Coordination Commission) and co-chaired by ISAF Commander General
David Petraeus and NATO representatives, the JANIB confirmed the 2011-2014 tran-
sition timeline. It emphasized stability and self-sufficiency as goals of transition. In
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February 2011, JANIB recommended the geographic areas assessed as prepared to be-
gin the transition process. Authorization to proceed from Stabilization into Transition
was decided by JANIB based on the following factors:2
1. The capability of the ANSF to shoulder additional security tasks with less assis-
tance from ISAF;
2. The level of security in the area, and the degree to which the local populace was
able to pursue routine daily activities;
3. The development of local governance structures, so that security would not be
undermined as ISAF assistance diminished;
4. The ability of ISAF to adjust its force levels and posture as the Afghan forces
expanded their capabilities, and as threats to security were reduced.
Although these criteria suggest a rules-based approach, the actual assessments and
recommendations of the JANIB board were not made public, and they remain clas-
sified. The final decision on the assignment to transition tranches was taken by the
Afghan cabinet, where political considerations played an important role, too. For ex-
ample, President Karzai is reported to have aimed at an ethnically and regionally bal-
anced first tranche, resulting in the inclusion of districts in the first tranche that were
not recommended. It was noted in 2012, that while NATO provided thorough security
assessments “ultimately, the transfer decision lies with President Hamid Karzai and
his principal advisor for transition, Ashraf Ghani. Complex political considerations,
including ethnic balancing, at times influence the transfer decisions, despite ISAF’s
advice.”3 Concerns over whether the JANIB board stuck to the initial aspiration set
out in the Lisbon NATO summit of a conditions-based, not calendar-driven, process
are highly questionable. As the process continued, the assignment of districts to dif-
ferent transition tranches became more and more opaque.4 While the allocation of
districts to transition tranches was subject to discretion, NATO’s commitment to five





transfers. The districts and their assignments to the ultimate transition tranches are
presented in Panel B of Figure 2.5 Our various difference-in-differences strategies ex-
ploit the temporal variation generated by the transition process. Section 3 provides
details of these strategies, and presents event-study evidence and pre-treatment ef-
fects to address concerns about endogeneity in the tranche assignments.
It is important to highlight that the security transfers marked a real shift in respon-
sibility, but did not represent a complete break. While ISAF troops were transferred
out of lead combat roles, the coalition maintained a supporting and advisory role
even after the transition. These trends are evident in Figure 3. This figure plots the
share of recorded events in the SIGACTS conflict dataset (described in Section 2.5)
that involved coalition and/or Afghan security forces together. Prior to the transition
onset, as ISAF was preparing Afghan forces for the handover of security responsibil-
ity, joint operations increased. This increase reflects the fact that Afghan forces were
deployed to the field. Toward the end of the transition, Afghan forces absorbed the
vast majority of all operations on their own. The transition announcement thus marks
the gradual handover of security responsibility to local forces, which typically took
between three and twelve months to complete, during which which NATO gradually
shifted into an oversight and supporting role otherwise known as overwatch. The
date of the announcement of a tranche and the naming of districts that would partic-
ipate in each wave was public information. We consider these security transfers the
first phase of the transition process. The second phase of the transition was the formal
withdrawal of troops and the closure of ISAF installations, which we describe in the
next subsection.
2.3 Base closures
Over the course of ISAF’s engagement, up to 140,000 NATO troops operated out
of an estimated 825 physical bases scattered across Afghanistan. The withdrawal of
most NATO forces led to the closure, demolition, or handing over to Afghan Security
Forces of nearly 800 of these bases. The vast majority of these bases were small, tactical
5We exclude Nimroz and Daykundi because they did not have a Provincial Reconstruction Team,
and did not experience a security transition. We also exclude Mihtarlam district, as different parts of
the district were transitioned at different points in time. Results are robust to not dropping these data.
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positions, such as Observation Posts or check points that were hosting, at most, small
troop consignments (SIGAR, 2016). Only a handful of bases still remain in NATO
operation under ISAF’s small-scale, follow-up mission, Resolute Support, which offi-
cially began on January 1, 2015, and currently involves around 12,000 troops.
We faced a major challenge in collecting data on base-level deployments from more
than 51 troop-sending countries; thus, we identified an alternative and robust method
for measuring and coding base closures. We relied on a set of military facilities reg-
ularly mentioned in the US Department of Defense Periodic Occupational and En-
vironmental Monitoring Summary (POEMS), which provides information about the
physical environment and environmental hazards of main bases and smaller bases
out of which NATO troops operated.6 The POEMS does not provide exact location
information or the exact date when bases ceased to be used for operations. However,
we used the list of 338 main base locations, and we conducted a systematic search
of sources and references for each base. We searched video and image-hosting plat-
forms for time-stamped video and images shared on social media by many soldiers
on deployment. In addition, we conducted systematic searches of main news sources
using the LexisNexis and Factiva news databases, along with standard search-engine
queries. For most bases we have several name variations as bases were sometimes
named after fallen soldiers and our list also includes a substantial number of bases
that were not exclusively under US command.
We were able to identify the district in which a subset of bases (170 of the 338 main
bases) are located, and we were able to confirm when the base was closed, handed
over to the Afghan Security Forces, or “retrograded” or demolished. It is likely that
our sample is biased toward including bases that were not physically demolished but
were handed over to the ANSF. We cannot confirm whether a base that was handed
over to the ANSF was subsequently used by Afghan forces. Given the lack of spatial
accuracy and the potential measurement error, we aggregate the information to the
district level, computing the date that the last base was either retrograded or handed
over in a district. Lastly, we also obtained data on the public handover ceremonies
6We restrict ourselves to the likely set of larger bases, such as forward operating bases, camps,
combat outposts, and bases hosting the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). There is no clear size
ranking. The PRTs are particularly important as most were operated by multinational forces.
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that were usually held at the end of the formal withdrawal process in the provincial
capitals. Since our base closure data do not provide us with a date for all districts in a
province, we infer the physical withdrawal date based on these handover ceremonies.
Base transitions and withdrawals tend to happen after the formal transfer of se-
curity responsibility (i.e., after the first phase of the transition). Panel A of Figure 4
presents the timing of the transition tranche announcement relative to the recorded
transition ceremony or base closure in months. The pattern that emerges is quite
evident: relative to the transition onset date, base closures and handovers were hap-
pening earlier in remote areas than in geographic centers. We argue that this pattern
is a consequence of the logistic organization of the withdrawal process – not a coinci-
dence or artifact of dataset construction. A host of compelling anecdotal documenta-
tion provides further support to this view, which we discuss below.
2.4 Exploiting logistic constraints as an instrument for the timing of
base closures
The physical withdrawal of ISAF troops and material was a significant logistical
challenge. Withdrawal was impeded by several factors. We exploit these factors to
inform the construction of an instrumental variable to isolate as-if random variation
in the sequencing of the physical closure of ISAF bases. First, the closest accessi-
ble sea port was Karachi, Pakistan, requiring transit through the Khyber Pass. This
route was shut down during the early phase of the transition (2011, 2012) after an
airstrike accidentally killed Pakistani troops. Second, convoys using the land-based
route through Uzbekistan’s Salang Pass were restricted from carrying weapons. Third,
land-based consolidation of heavy machinery was restricted by poor road infrastruc-
ture in Afghanistan. Fourth, restrictions on equipment handover created a substantial
burden: the US alone had $36 billion worth of heavy equipment, armaments, and
sensitive resources that needed to be relocated. Together, ISAF forces needed to move
more than 70,000 vehicles and 120,000 industrial shipping containers (Loven, 2013).
To address these challenges, ISAF used heavy-duty, long-haul C-17 Globemaster
planes to transport equipment from Afghanistan to Kuwait. The size of these air-
craft implied that only a few airports could be used as retrograde hubs. These nodal
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bases informed both the timing and geographic sequencing of the pullout. Smaller
or remote bases were handed over first, with materials consolidated around larger
bases with transport capabilities. Forward Operating Base (FOB) Torkham in Mo-
mand Dara district of Nangarhar province offers an illustrative example. The base
was formally handed over to the ANSF on December 18, 2013. FOB Torkham was lo-
cated on the border with Pakistan. Despite the relative proximity of a transit point to
leave Afghanistan, most of the equipment from FOB Torkham was sent 73 km inland
to Jalalabad Airfield by road and using sling-loaded CH-53 helicopters. From there,
materials were transferred an additional 185 kilometers to the Bagram north of Kabul.
From there, materials were flown out to Kuwait using C-17 Globemaster airplanes.7
The above discussion suggests that access to a small subset of bases was crucial
up until the last stages of the military pullout. As a consequence, bases were closed
from the outside in, consecutively starting with the outlying bases with difficult or
limited access to these central transport hubs. We use this information, together with
information on the available road network, to construct a variable capturing the travel
distance on the least-cost path to one of the ten logistical hubs. The resulting in-
strument is presented in Panel B of Figure 4. We show that our results are robust to
controlling for a host of other distance measures, most importantly, the distance to the
nearest airport of any type (i.e., including airfields not suited for heavy cargo planes).
2.5 Measuring Conflict Activity and Perceptions
We rely on two novel microlevel data sources that allow us to combine results from
institutionally tracked conflict data with detailed survey data.
2.5.1 Significant Activities Event Data
Afghanistan provides a rich environment for investigating security transitions, and
as we describe below, our study overcomes several critical obstacles that usually limit
the ability to draw meaningful and robust inferences. We rely on newly declas-
sified microdata collected by ISAF and local national security partners secured by
Shaver and Wright (2016). Throughout the ongoing conflict, these security forces have
tracked insurgent attacks by documenting the approximate time and precise location
7See https://bit.ly/33vw7iH.
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of attacks perpetrated against them or reported to them. This dataset includes more
than 200,000 individual observations of insurgent attacks between 2008 and 2014, each
of which is identified by attack type (e.g., attack by direct fire, attack via the use of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs)).
Afghan insurgents undertook several primary types of attacks throughout the war.
These involved attacks from direct fire, IEDs, and other combat activity. Direct fire in-
cludes attacks perpetrated at close range (direct line-of-sight encounters). Individual
insurgents (often acting in groups) carry out these attacks in a variety of ways. IEDs
tend to be directed against moving targets (e.g., vehicle patrols and convoys); IEDs
are typically placed on or immediately around roadways. Our data also track indirect
fire combat events. Indirect fire refers to attacks that include mortars and rockets,
which can be launched from much greater distances, but tend to be far less accurate.
Nevertheless, even when mortars and rockets fail to strike their intended target, they
often create loud explosions that can be heard over relatively large distances.
2.5.2 Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research Survey Data
Our survey evidence relies on the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment
Research (ANQAR) platform. ANQAR tracks civilian attitudes toward government,
anti-government entities, and coalition partners. Survey responses are collected on a
quarterly basis by local contractors. Before administering a survey wave, local elders
are contacted to secure permission for enumerators to enter villages. When enu-
merators could not access sampled villages, intercept interviews were used to collect
information from residents traveling in neighboring areas (Child, 2016). Questions
vary by survey wave, but the questions most relevant to our investigation are con-
sistently included. Although early waves have higher nonresponse rates than later
waves, these rates are consistently lower (5-10%) than those of comparable national
surveys conducted in the United States and Europe (Condra and Wright, 2019). We
have restricted access to data from 2008 to 2016, covering roughly 370,000 respon-
dents, through a data-sharing agreement with NATO. Summary statistics of the data
are presented in Table A1.
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2.5.3 Other data sources used
We rely on digital placemats from ISAF archives to link districts to regional com-
mands, and we classify districts using a standardized administrative map compiled
by the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) research group. All events and survey
waves are rectified to match this map. We incorporate information from the Afghan
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is a military-led scheme
for small-scale development projects. These data were obtained through formal chan-
nels; these data cover new projects initiated until the beginning of 2014, and they
include projects that were active during 2014 and beyond. In addition, our empirical
analysis includes detailed land-cover data, grid-cell population data, and measures of
elevation and terrain features that we exploit in our empirical designs.
3 Empirical strategy
Our paper studies the impact of the two main phases of the security transition:
(1) the transfer of control from ISAF to the ANSF, and (2) the physical withdrawal of
ISAF troops. We rely on different strategies to estimate these effects, which we detail
in this section. Lastly, we discuss in detail how we leverage new methods from spatial
econometrics to flexibly control for for conflict displacement.
3.1 Security transfer to ANSF
Our baseline empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences approach, compar-
ing districts in which the security transition has been implemented to non-treated
districts, before and after the transition.
yd,r,t = ad + br,t + g ˆ Handoverd,t + hd ˆ t + ed,r,t (1)
In the equation above, d indicates the district, r the Regional Command (RC) and t
the quarter. Handoverd,t switches on when ANSF takes over from ISAF. At the district
and quarter level our outcome measures yd,r,t come from both the SIGACTS incident
and ANQAR survey data. While the SIGACTS data contains finer timestamps, the
ANQAR survey data are collected quarterly. In order to maintain consistency, we
use the quarterly frequency for the district-level analysis. We allow each district to
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follow a specific linear trend hd ˆ t, and we allow for regional command specific non-
linear time effects (br,t). The RC, indexed by r, served as one of the most important
organizational units in ISAF, and it is possible that reporting practices differed by
regional command; hence the choice of the time fixed effects.
Our preferred outcome for the SIGACTS data at the district level is the logarithm of
incidents (plus one). This specification allows us to capture changes on the extensive
and intensive margins, but is less sensitive to vertical outliers.8 Our estimate of the
coefficient g captures the causal impact of the security transition as long as conflict in
districts in different transition tranches were following common trends. As discussed
in the background section, the selection into different transition tranches was based
on a variety of factors that were not clearly linked to trends in violence. To validate
our estimates, we provide evidence in support of the common trends assumption
based on both event studies around the transition dates, and on the estimation of
pre-treatment effects. We introduce these tests later. As a baseline, Table A2 shows
that several baseline characteristics were not balanced at the district level. However,
more violent districts are not systematically allocated to later tranches. There are
few significant differences between violence levels when we compare tranches 1 to 2,
and 3 to 4. Only tranches 3 and 5 appear to have been more violent compared to the
preceding tranche.9 Our basic district-level panel includes district-specific, linear time
trends to alleviate the concerns associated with these baseline differences.
3.2 ISAF troop withdrawal
At the end of the transition process, the vast majority of the troops with ISAF
physically left Afghanistan. While the troop withdrawal was made possible by the
transfer of control to the ANSF, its timing was not mechanically linked to the for-
mal security transfers. Unlike the transfer process, which was constrained by a fixed
schedule of five tranches, the decision to close or hand over individual bases was
8Our results are robust to alternative transformations of the dependent variable. We present these
results in Tables A6 and A7: the inverse hyperbolic sine (asinh), per capita specifications using different
population measures, and level outcomes (i.e. counts) in a Poisson model. In Online Appendix, Section
B we present results from another identification strategy that uses smaller grid-cells, and works with
binary violence outcomes.
9As a robustness check, we present treatment effects by tranche in Table A11.
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highly discretionary and district specific. Closures were in part driven by local as-
sessment of Afghan troop training and preparation to operate independent of for-
eign support. The endogenous sequencing of base closures may overstate subsequent
battlefield gains. On the other hand, the Taliban may have been more effective at
launching attacks against ANSF forces after withdrawal. These two dynamics could
offset one another, yielding naı̈ve estimates that are biased toward zero. This makes
identification of the effect of the withdrawal phase particularly challenging.
We try to overcome these identification concerns by exploiting the importance of
logistical constraints for the withdrawal process. As described in Section 2.4, a small
number of military-grade airports acted as crucial logistical hubs during the with-
drawal process. We hypothesize that bases that were farthest removed from these
airports saw their ISAF troops leave first once the transition process started (i.e., after
2011). We use a a least-cost path algorithm (illustrated in Figure 4) to calculate dis-
tances from every district to the nearest military airport, and we use the interaction
of this distance measure with a dummy for the post-2011 period as an instrument for
ISAF troop withdrawal. The corresponding first stage is:
cd,r,t = ad + br,t +g ˆ Handoverd,t +l ˆ Hub Distanced ˆ Postt + zt ˆ Xd + hd ˆ t+ ed,r,t
(2)
cd,r,t is a dummy indicator that switches to one when, according to our dataset, the
last military base has closed in the district. This outcome is defined at the district
level, and its construction is described in detail in Section
In the second stage, we model violence outcomes yd,t as follows:
yd,r,t = ad + br,t + g ˆ Handoverd,t + k ˆ ĉd,r,t + zt ˆ Xd + hd ˆ t + ed,r,t (3)
where k is the quantity of interest associated with ĉd,r,t, the instrumented withdrawal
sequence. For the exclusion restriction to hold, the differential effect of the distance
to military-grade airports after 2011 on conflict outcomes can only operate through
the withdrawal of ISAF troops. Importantly, the inclusion of unit fixed effects ad-
dresses any time-invariant sources of bias that are district specific and correlated with
proximity to military airfields, including geographic suitability for rural insurgent ac-
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tivity. Our identification strategy leverages only the differential effect of proximity
after the withdrawal begins. Any operational disruptions across regional commands
over time that may be correlated with the sequencing of closures are also absorbed
in our benchmark fixed effects. The exclusion restriction could still be violated if the
time-varying effects of military airfield proximity are correlated with time-varying ef-
fects of nearby market activity. The inclusion of time-varying effects of other market-
oriented distances, such as distance to any type of airport in our vector of covariates
Xd, helps address this concern. The withdrawal may have coincided with a shift in
Taliban activity away from remote areas near provincial borders along the outer reach
of ISAF-supported provincial reconstruction teams, and toward population centers.
We account for this potential source of bias by incorporating the time-varying effects
of proximity to provincial borders. It is also possible that districts in different co-
horts (handover tranches) were exposed to correlated shocks to military equipment,
training, or preparation that impacted base closures. The importance of these factors
could have varied over time as the transition and withdrawal neared completion. We
account for these factors in two ways: directly controlling for the timing of the han-
dover, and, in a separate approach, flexibly estimating tranche-specific time effects.
3.3 Conflict displacement
We now consider a specification that adds displacement effects to the difference-
and-differences (Equation 1) and instrumental-variable specifications (Equation 3).
One potential concern is that insurgent activity is likely highly mobile, and that the
transition to ANSF might have induced a strategic reallocation to other districts. In
this case, spillovers may affect the identification of transition effects – both at the onset
and at the withdrawal. We consider a specification with spatial spillover effects to ac-
count for possible transition externalities. In what follows, we focus on the version of
the difference-in-differences specification (1) with spatial controls. The instrumental-
variable version follows with minimal changes. We implement a specification of the
form:








wd,jyj,r,t + hd ˆ t + ed,r,t (4)
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where wd,j captures the extent to which district j affects d. The spillover effects may
happen either because conflict in district d is affected by handover in other districts
(through the combined transition indicator d
∞N
j=1,j‰d wd,jHandoverj,t, or “exogenous
effects”) or by conflict in other districts (through r
∞N
j=1,j‰d wd,jyd,r,t or “endogenous
effects”, both after Manski, 1993). The presence of district-time linear interactions and
regional command-time nonlinear effects control for the correlated effects.
We explore several specifications of (4) with different choices of weights. Our
exercises also leverage a novel estimation strategy taken from de Paula et al. (2019) to
recover the weights wd,j along with the parameters g, d and r from within the data.
We find the main treatment effects to be robust to the inclusion of spatial controls
over a vast array of specifications. More details are provided in the Online Appendix,
Section A.
4 Main Results
We first discuss the effect of the security transfer to ANSF, and then present esti-
mates of the impact of ISAF troop withdrawal.
4.1 Phase I: Security handover to ANSF
Table 1 shows the effects of the security transition for the most important conflict
outcomes in our military records—fatal events, direct fire attacks, and IED (Impro-
vised Explosive Device) explosions. Our baseline difference-in-differences specifica-
tion at the district level shows that the intensity of violence dropped sharply when
the ANSF became responsible for security provision. We estimate that the security
transition led to approximately 0.12 of a standard deviation (SD) decline in casualty
events overall, with a 0.1 of an SD reduction in direct line-of-sight combat events and a
.075 of an SD decline in IED explosions. While the inclusion of district-specific trends
and RC ˆ time fixed effects weakens the results slightly, the estimated effects remain
large and precisely estimated in this demanding specification. To validate our esti-
mates, we introduce a number of event studies, which are presented in Figure 5. They
provide evidence of the common trends assumption that underlies our difference-in-
differences estimates. We see flat trends prior to the security transition, and marked
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drops once security responsibility had been formally handed over to ANSF – as indi-
cated by the vertical line in the subfigures. In Figure 6, we present coefficient estimates
from our main specification for a wider set of violence outcomes. These additional
outcomes include fatal events involving security forces, civilians, and insurgents, as
well as indirect fire attacks. Across this broader set of violence measures, we observe
consistent drops in conflict (between .065 and .15 of an SD) after the responsibility for
security provision has been transferred to ANSF.
We present the analysis of the spatial spillovers in Table A4 for the SIGACTS
data. In Column (1), we replicate the coefficients from the differences-in-differences
analysis. Columns (2)-(7) initially implement standard spatial spillover regressions
with known and given proximity matrices (e.g., Ferrara and Harari, 2018). More
specifically, we define as two districts as “connected” if they are neighbors, neighbors
of neighbors; within neighboring provinces; within a geodesical distance of less than
250km or 500km; and within a driving distance of less than 500km. As motivated
in Subsection 3.3, those specifications are rather restrictive because they impose very
strong assumptions behind the mechanism of displacement. Thus, we also utilize the
data to inform about the pattern of spillovers. This is accomplished by estimating the
weights wd,j, and the results are seen in columns (8)-(10) for various specifications. To
slightly reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we assume that districts that are too
distant (with driving distances above 500km and, separately with driving distances
above 1000km) are unconnected and thus wd,j = 0. In all cases, we observe that the
majority of the point estimates for the treatment effects are robust to the inclusion of
displacement effects.
Table 2 shows results for ANQAR survey responses. The ANQAR data are only
available at the district level, and, for consistency, we report results for the most
demanding specifications at this level. Table 2 includes measures that are systemati-
cally collected across many different ANQAR survey waves independently from the
SIGACTS data. These results suggest that the shift in security perceptions matches
the changes we observed in the tactical reports.
The share of respondents who reported security improved in the last six months
after the ANSF took over security (column 1) increased by approximately .12 of an SD.
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They also perceive that the Taliban had grown weaker since the transition (column 2)
(0.1 of an SD), even if this effect is marginally insignificant. Moreover, respondents
were more likely to have seen the Afghan National Army (ANA) (i.e., the most im-
portant component of the ANSF) in their village at least once a month (column 3), and
they were more likely to respond that the Afghan forces bring security to their area
(column 4), each shifting about 0.1 of an SD. This suggests that the formal transfer of
security responsibility during the transition process is clearly perceived as such. The
consistency of our results across data types (military records and individual survey
evidence), together with our demanding empirical designs, gives us confidence in the
robustness of this core finding.10 Yet, as shown in column 5 of Table 2, the security
transfer does not appear to have affected the perceptions of the local population about
who is actually in control of their area. This suggests that the security transfer, while
being associated with improvements in the perceived security situation, seems to have
failed at shifting the underlying fundamentals of the conflict. This result foreshadows
our findings regarding the second phase of the security transition.
4.2 Phase II: Withdrawal of ISAF troops
The initial transfer of security to the ANSF was followed by the gradual closure
of ISAF bases. As discussed in Section 2.3, the logistical challenges of organizing the
troop withdrawal imposed a certain structure on the military pullout. We instrument
the sequence of base closure with the interaction of the distance to the closest military
airport hub and a dummy for the post-2011 period (see equations 2 and 3). Table 3
presents the first-stage results and confirms that our interacted distance measure does
a good job predicting the timing of base closures in a district. This remains true when
we control for distance to the closest airport of any type (i.e., including non-military
airports) and province borders in column (2), as well as for time-varying effects of the
transition tranche in column (3).
We take the instrumental variable strategy and contrast our IV estimates with the
naı̈ve OLS results in Table 4. The OLS results, presented in Panel A, suggest that base
10In particular for the quality of the SIGACTS data may have been affected by the security transition
itself despite continuous collection throughout NATO’s withdrawal (as evidenced in Panel A of Figure
A2). The consistency across the two data sources is thus reassuring.
20
closures are not associated with any significant changes in conflict outcomes. As we
argued earlier, the OLS estimates could suffer from endogeneity problems because
the district-specific sequencing of base closures was highly discretionary and likely
influenced by local assessments of Afghan troop training and battlefield readiness.
If bases were closed earlier in districts where violence was expected to decrease, the
OLS coefficients we estimate would mask any violence-enhancing effect of foreign
troop withdrawal. If the magnitude of these cross-cutting effects is comparable, we
would expect to estimate an OLS result close to zero – which is what we find.
Panel B of Table 4 presents our IV results. When we instrument for the sequencing
of base closure using the time-varying effect of military airfield proximity, we find a
consistent violence-increasing effect of the base closure on our main conflict outcomes
in columns (1) through (6). The post-withdrawal increase in violence ranges from
approximately 0.4 to 0.7 of a SD. In fact, contrasting the direct effect of the security
handover with the effect of the base closures in columns (1), (3), and (5), the increase
in violence due to the base closures fully offsets the reductions in combat activity due
to the security transfer, with a net increase in conflict of approximately 0.3 of a SD.
This finding is robust to using exclusively within-tranche variation, by including
a set of tranche ˆ time fixed effects (in columns 2, 4, and 6). Hence, the uptick
in violence cannot be explained by a general time pattern that is specific to districts
belonging to an individual tranche. Rather, the increased violence appears to reflect an
effect that is specific to the physical withdrawal of international troops independent of
the transfer announcement. In Figure 7 we study a broader set of conflict outcomes at
the district level. We also implement our spatial econometric technique for calibrating
network weights, and we introduce them in the IV framework. In Table A5 we confirm
that the estimates are robust to the inclusion of spillover controls.
To what extent do these distinct effects on conflict outcomes map into changes
in the perceived security situation? In Table 5, we present results studying ANQAR
survey-response data. In Panel A, we estimate both the effect of the security transition
onset, as well as the effect of the (instrumented) physical base closure. The picture
that emerges is consistent with our findings from the SIGACTS conflict data; while
the transition onset is associated with a marked improvement in the perceived secu-
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rity situation, the physical withdrawal and base closure are associated with a reported
worsening of the security situation. Accounting for both phases of the security transi-
tion, perceived security deteriorated by more than .4 of an SD. In addition, perceptions
that the Taliban had grown weaker strongly reverse, suggesting that civilians believe
the Taliban had, indeed, become stronger after bases were closed. Despite a notable
increase in reported Afghan troop patrols, civilians suggested that local forces were
less likely to bring security after the withdrawal of foreign forces. In Panel B, we study
the same outcomes, yet, only exploiting within-tranche variation. This precludes the
estimation of the security transfer to ANSF because this variable is perfectly collinear
with the tranche-by-time fixed effects. Our results remain robust, suggesting that the
closure of bases is indeed associated with a significant worsening of the security situ-
ation. Before turning to a discussion of the underlying mechanism, we highlight the
additional robustness checks that we performed.
4.3 Robustness
In the Online Appendix, we introduce a range of robustness checks.
Matched distant gridcell pairs. In an attempt to relax the identification assumption
that underlies our main district level difference-in-differences approach, we change
the unit of analysis to 10ˆ10km gridcells. This is only possible for the SIGACTS data,
as the ANQAR survey data are reported at the district level. In the resulting high-
resolution dataset, we construct pairs of matched gridcells using baseline population,
elevation, road connections, and land-cover data. The gridcell-level outcomes show
reductions in violence that are larger although it should be kept in mind that this is
at the extensive margin of our violence outcomes. For more details on the matching
procedure, see the Online Appendix, Section B. For the summary statistics at the
gridcell level, see Table A8. Results for the gridcell analysis are presented in Table
A10, along with event study graphs in Figure A3.
Tranche-by-tranche effects. We look at heterogeneous effects by tranche in Table
A11. We confirm that the effects are not driven by a single tranche. Even if the
magnitudes differ across tranches, the signs are consistent and significant for key
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outcomes in multiple tranches.
Pre-treatment effects. We study whether the the security transfer to ANSF has ef-
fects prior to the treatment announcement for the broader set of of outcomes in Fig-
ures A4 and A5. The vast majority of these pre-treatment effects are insignificant and
small compared to the actual treatment effects.
5 Mechanisms
Afghanistan’s security transition could affect violence outcomes through a large
set of mechanisms. We consider several plausible alternative mechanisms below.
5.1 Withdrawal of foreign targets
In principle, the transfer of security to the ANSF could reduce violence because
the ability of the Taliban to mobilize was weakened by the security transition. How-
ever, this explanation cannot account for the increase in violence we observe after the
base closures. Another interpretation of the reduction in local violence following the
security transfer, is that the ANSF were more effective, for example because they mo-
nopolized violence better than the multinational ISAF, or because they coordinated
more effectively with the local population. In this sense, foreign troops were perhaps
no longer required to support security provision. These mechanisms are similarly
consistent with the decline in violence after the first phase of the transition, but are
inconsistent with the violence-increasing effect of base closures and withdrawal.
5.2 Complementarities during the transition period
Our main results are consistent with the idea that complementarities between ISAF
and ANSF generate improved security outcomes, to the extent that ISAF base closures
eliminate the gains in security outcomes that accompany the security transfer. These
complementarities could arise because ISAF monitors the ANSF, and provides mil-
itary support after local forces take operational command. The combination of the
ANSF leading operations and receiving feedback, combat support, and development
assistance could have reduced violence during the first phase. These gains could
have been reversed with the end of overwatch and the physical withdrawal of troops.
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In Table 6, we investigate the complementarities mechanism. Additional monitoring
during the first phase could have reduced misbehavior by Afghan troops, improving
community relations, but we find no evidence of that type of shift (column 1). We
also find no evidence of a change in perceived ability of the ANSF to operate inde-
pendently of ISAF, or of ANSF capacity to defeat the Taliban following the security
handover (columns 2 and 3). We also find no evidence that one dominant form of
development assistance, the US Army Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP), was targeted to enhance the effectiveness of Afghan forces during the transi-
tion process (column 4).
We also investigate potential complementarities in tactical support activities (Ta-
ble A12). In particular, we might expect that foreign forces would be marginally more
likely to respond to violent events that trigger combat support following the security
handover. Columns (1) and (3) show that close air support and medical evacuations
are highly correlated with contemporaneous close combat and direct fire attacks, yet
columns (2) and (4) show no marginal changes in combat support after the secu-
rity handover. Column (5) shows that IED explosions coincide with additional bomb
clearance, yet bomb neutralization does not significantly improve during the security
handover (column 6). It is still possible that Afghan troops experienced a temporary,
unobserved shock to their fighting capacity. One such shock would be large-scale
transfers of ammunition and weaponry to Afghan troops whose supplies had been
depleted before the withdrawal of foreign troops. Prior theoretical work suggests this
would lead to a composition shift in combat (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013), reducing
close-range attacks and increasing roadside bomb deployment. However, tables 1 and
4 indicate that this type of tactical shift did not occur following the handover. Overall,
we fail to identify any clear evidence consistent with short-lived tactical complemen-
tarities that could explain the main results.
5.3 Lying Low
One compelling mechanism that could account for our findings is a strategic deci-
sion by the Taliban to scale back violence during the transition period. Local security
transfers were particularly important because they created an overwatch period in
which the relative capacity of the Taliban and the ANSF was signaled to ISAF forces.
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As such, the Taliban had an incentive to understate its capacity in a manner that was
both difficult to detect, and that confirmed NATO forces’ biases (i.e., that Afghan
security forces were ably trained and capable of delivering security on their own).
We briefly formalize this logic in a simple game in which violence serves as a signal
about the relative capacities of the Taliban and the ANSF. This formalization helps sit-
uate the conflict patterns we observe as the equilibrium outcome of a plausible, albeit
stylized, strategic interaction between combatants during a foreign-to-local security
transition.
5.3.1 A simple model of Lying Low
Our model studies the interaction between a local Taliban group and an ISAF unit
as a signaling game. We assume that the capacity of the ANSF versus the Taliban is
q P t0, 1u, the cost for the Taliban of staging attacks. Importantly, q cannot be observed
directly by ISAF. In the first period of the game, ISAF maintains its full capacity µ ° 1.
ISAF chooses to enter overwatch (i.e., not to use capacity against the Taliban) during
the first phase of the transition (Period 1). The Taliban chooses the level of attacks
a P t0, 1u according to the objective function: [a ´ qa]. If the game would end in the
first period, it is clear that the Taliban would choose a = 1 if q = 0.
To capture the transition dynamics, we assume that ISAF makes a final decision
to maintain capacity or not at the start of Period 2. In the parameters of the model,
this means that ISAF can keep µ ° 1 (i.e., the initial level), or scale down to µ = 0.
Maintaining µ in Period 2 costs c. This cost includes the direct cost of maintaining
capacity, but it also incorporates the large political costs of maintaining a military
presence.11 As in Period 1, the insurgents attack according to their objective function
in Period 2. We assume that the Taliban does not just engage with the ANSF in
Period 2, but also with ISAF, which uses its remaining capacity µ. So, the second-
period objective function is: [a2 ´ (q + µ)a2]. We give the second-period weight c ° 1,
as we assume the Taliban puts more weight on the long-term, post-transition period.
The order of the game can be summarized as follows:
1. Nature draws q P t0, 1u with E(q) = s
11For a discussion of the political costs of maintaining a military presence, see Marinov et al. (2015).
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2. The Taliban chooses a1 P t0, 1u
3. The Taliban receives a Period 1 pay-off [a1 ´ qa1]; the Period 1 pay-off for ISAF
does not matter.
4. ISAF observes a1 and chooses µ2 P t0, µu
5. The Taliban chooses a2 P t0, 1u
6. The Period 2 pay-offs for the Taliban: c[a2 ´ (q + µ2)a2]
7. The Period 2 pay-offs for ISAF: [´a2 ´ cµ2]
A pooling equilibrium now exists with a1 = 0 and µ2 = 0 if 1 ´ s † cµ † 1. In
period 2, a2 = 0 if the Taliban has low capacity relative to the ANSF (q = 1), and
a2 = 1 if the Taliban has high capacity. The pooling equilibrium where the Taliban is
a high type is consistent with the empirical results we observe. In this case, violence
levels would be low during the initial period, ISAF would withdraw, and violence
levels would increase after withdrawal.12
5.3.2 Stylized facts about the transition
The stylized model has two features that deserve further discussion in the context
of Afghanistan’s transition: that ISAF learns about the relative fighting capacity of the
Taliban, and the assumption that ISAF does not use violence in Period 1.
The model assumes that the local Taliban’s type while fighting Afghan forces is
unknown to ISAF. During an extended conflict where combatants update about their
opponent’s type, this assumption may seem implausible (Powell, 2006). While ISAF
continually assessed their relative capabilities, less was known about the battlefield
readiness of the ANSF to take on the Taliban, especially at a local level. This was due
to several factors. Credible intelligence about Taliban force strength was thin. At-
trition within ANSF ranks was severe, with as many as 33 percent of troops turning
over each year. Battlefield preparation trackers were highly subjective, with evaluation
12Wittman (1979) points out that a unilateral reduction in conflict intensity can prolong conflict
though for distinct reasons. In Wittman’s discussion, a unilateral reduction in violence reduces mil-
itary costs, and results in fewer casualties, lowering political costs for both sides. In our case, the
Taliban’s reduction in violence facilitated withdrawal (because political costs remained high for NATO
countries), and weakened the remaining military forces (the ANSF).
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standards changing during the transition, and ISAF changing the level of evaluation
from the battalions to brigades – effectively losing track of information about local
preparedness.13 Observing how the conflict developed during the security handover
was the first signal foreign troops had about how local Afghan troops would handle
their new operational command role fighting the Taliban. Official US Department of
Defense (DoD) documents suggest that international forces thought they were learn-
ing about the relative capacity of the ANSF and Taliban, and that signals from the
handover phase were interpreted positively. As a communique dated July 2013, when
the transition was ongoing, noted, “During the reporting period, the ANSF has per-
formed effectively in the field, losing no major bases or district centers to the insur-
gency and protecting the majority of the Afghan population. Although challenges
remain, the ANSF demonstrated an increasing level of effectiveness.”14
In the model, ISAF chooses to enter overwatch during the first phase of the tran-
sition. As such, it does not use its capacity against the Taliban during the first period
of the game; instead it hands over operational command to the ANSF and observes
the level of violence produced by the Taliban. As argued in the previous paragraph,
this period could have allowed ISAF to update its priors about the relative capacity
of the Taliban versus the ANSF.15 The historical context suggests there were addi-
tional reasons for why ISAF would not use its fighting capacity during the handover
phase. First, ISAF did not have the military authority to deviate from the handover
schedule. Second, reverting from overwatch would have disrupted the new command
structure. Such a change would have also visibly undermined the authority of local
forces in the communities where they conducted patrols and operations – potentially
13We provide additional details in the Online Appendix, Section C.
14See https://bit.ly/3fPYhdb.
15Under the pooling equilibrium, ISAF does not receive meaningful information about the Taliban’s
type, but it also does not experience significant battlefield losses (since the Taliban produces a low
level of violence). It is possible to model an explicit benefit for ISAF to go in overwatch in Period 1.
For example, if the Taliban is non-strategic (or impatient) with a certain probability. In this extension,
the Taliban will sometimes reveal its type in Period 1, which allows ISAF to adjust its withdrawal
decision. Our model can also be reinterpreted: µ2 could capture a sticky investment by ISAF in the
local ANSF capacity, even if ISAF has committed to withdraw in Period 2 under all circumstances. It is
also worth noting that the model has a semi-separating equilibrium (which is not a good explanation of
the observed almost complete withdrawal of ISAF, but could be consistent with investments in ANSF
capacity) in which the Taliban’s action in Period 1 is informative.
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reducing public confidence in the long-run ability of Afghan troops to effectively pro-
vide security. More broadly, political leaders of troop-sending countries made their
commitment to the security transition public, repeatedly referring to the process as
“irreversible,”16 in an effort to raise the political costs of stalling or reversing the
handover.
We cannot fully rule out a variant of the “lying low” mechanism whereby the
Taliban reduce violence to speed up the transition logistically, even if NATO’s beliefs
of the relative fighting capacity of the Taliban are irrelevant to the transition process.
However, we think the stylized signalling model we present matches the historical
context well, particularly the overwatch period, as highlighted in this subsection.
5.4 Policy Relevance
Our study addresses a topic of substantial economic and policy significance: the
transition of military control to local forces after an international military interven-
tion. Our findings suggest that insurgents acted strategically around the withdrawal,
responding to the two phases differently. Violence decreased after the announcement
of the local transition of security forces, but increased after the physical withdrawal of
troops. We suggest that the Taliban calibrated its violence to manipulate the signals
that ISAF received about both the capacity of local security forces and the strength
of the insurgency. Once the political costs of re-intervention had become sufficiently
high, rebels expanded their combat operations. Withdrawal schedules, thus, might
endanger post-occupation stability by tying the hands of political and military lead-
ers.17 In this respect, the experience of Afghanistan is not unique. To unpack the
policy relevance of the Afghan security transition, we briefly introduce facts from two
historical cases: the Soviet Union’s transfer of power to Afghan forces in 1989, and the
end of US-led operations in Iraq in 2011. Each of these cases reveal similar patterns
of insurgent violence declining during the initial phase of the security transition and
surging after the final withdrawal of foreign troops.
Soviet forces first entered Afghanistan in 1979 in an attempt to support commu-
16See https://reut.rs/3mndyEV.
17Not all interventions end with a formal, staggered withdrawal schedule. The Italian-led interven-
tion in Albania (Operation Alba), for example, rapidly transitioned policing operations back to local
forces following a national election (Perlmutter, 1998; Dobbins James et al., 2008).
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nist government forces. The mission was narrowly defined as a stabilization effort in-
tended to help the government consolidate control over the outlying provinces (Gom-
pert et al., 2014). The first formal plans for withdrawal were drafted in 1985. In 1988,
the Afghan Geneva Accords were signed, leading to a temporary ceasefire and a pub-
licly announced timetable for Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The subsequent decline in
insurgent activity raised expectations about a successful handover of security. How-
ever, after the withdrawal, mujahideen forces abandoned the ceasefire agreement and
engaged in open attacks on government compounds. By that point in time, the po-
litical costs of another intervention were too great. Three years later, Soviet economic
assistance was withdrawn, and the Afghan government was unable to pay salaries,
bribe tribal militias, or manage the economy. During this period of instability and
fighting between rival mujahideen factions, the Taliban emerged, eventually establish-
ing control over most of the country (with the exception of some northern provinces)
by 1998. Rebel forces strategically reduced violence levels until after foreign troops
withdrew and the political costs of conducting another intervention were prohibitive
(Smith, 2014) – a situation that has striking parallels to the Afghanistan security tran-
sition we study in this paper. The subsequent political instability – which is similar to
the political situation that has unfolded in Afghanistan after the NATO withdrawal –
created a window of opportunity for opposition forces to consolidate territorial con-
trol without directly confronting well-equipped Soviet fighters. Despite the parallels
between this historical episode and the recent security transition in Afghanistan, the
political factions that formed the core mujahideen resistance forces and the modern
Taliban are largely distinct. This suggests that similarities across the Soviet and NATO
withdrawals are not simply a repeated strategy by the same military actors. Instead,
these consistent patterns of violence suggest how insurgents can strategically respond
to foreign-to-local security transitions.
The transfer of power following the US-led operations in Iraq also exhibits strong
parallels to the recent Afghan transition. In 2008, the Status of Forces Agreement laid
out the timeline for withdrawal. Starting in July 2009, US troops no longer patrolled
in urban centers. In September 2010, operational control over primary security provi-
sion was handed over to Iraqi troops. During this period, 50,000 US troops remained
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in Iraq to support the transition, and violence decreased sharply. After the admin-
istrations of US President Barack Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
failed to reach a consensus on legal immunity for US forces, the US prepared for a
complete withdrawal by mid-December 2011. The conflict reemerged during and after
this phase of the security transition. Several high-profile attacks targeted the Iraqi par-
liament and a number of transferred US military bases; a large-scale insurgent assault
took place in Basra. As Lake (2019, 258) points out, withdrawal enabled al-Maliki to
take complete control over security, including cutting funding for the Sunni-backed
Awakening Forces. Following this last phase of the security transition, sectarian vio-
lence flared. By 2014, the Islamic State (IS) emerged as a major threat to Iraqi security,
capturing the city of Mosul.
These cases suggest that the patterns of violence we observe in Afghanistan may
reflect a broader conflict dynamic that emerges from the withdrawals of foreign oc-
cupations as wars end. These historical transitions confirm that insights from the
findings of our study may generalize to other contexts, including ongoing peace ne-
gotiations with the Taliban.
The Trump administration reentered negotiations with the Taliban in late 2019 af-
ter the failed meeting at Camp David scheduled for the week of September 11. After
agreeing to a temporary seven-day ceasefire between combatants, the Taliban coordi-
nated a drawdown of its forces, and significantly reduced attack activity. US officials,
in turn, agreed to the first phase of a peace deal, which was signed on February 29,
2020. This first phase includes releasing 5,000 Taliban fighters from Afghan govern-
ment prisons, and a diplomatic engagement with the elected government of President
Ashraf Ghani. The signing ceremony, attended by US Special Representative Zalmay
Khalilzad and Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was touted as a symbolic
victory by the Taliban. Classified intelligence collected since the first-phase agree-
ment was signed suggests that the Taliban is prepared to violate the terms of this
peace agreement and overwhelm the Ghani government once US forces withdraw –
which parallels the dynamics that surfaced with the withdrawal of both Soviet forces
in 1989 and the majority of NATO forces in 2014.18 Despite reassurances from the US
18See https://nbcnews.to/33v1XfD.
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Secretary of Defense that the United States would “not hesitate to nullify the agree-
ment,” President Donald Trump has stated his view more bluntly. When asked about
the intelligence suggesting the Taliban were planning to overrun the government, he
said, “Countries have to take care of themselves... You can only hold someone’s hand
for so long.”19
6 Conclusion
Our analysis of the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan reveals a trou-
bling pattern: a short-term reduction in conflict in the first phase of security han-
dovers, followed by a surge in violence as actual departures took place. Our findings
suggest that such short-run impacts of the security transition may appear to be posi-
tive and meaningful; indeed, in the case Afghanistan, they led to the prevailing belief
at the time that local forces were more capable, and that the Taliban forces had grown
weaker sooner than had been expected. However, these effects reversed themselves
as the transition entered a new phase, with the actual withdrawal of international
troops.
This article makes several contributions to the economics of conflict literature.
Prior work has largely focused on economic causes of civil conflict, and government
use of economic incentives, typically development aid, to quell violence during the
course of an insurgency. Largely ignored are questions about the conditions under
which security transitions can successfully transfer military power to local forces. We
are able to explore these questions by bringing together highly detailed conflict micro-
data with survey measures that enable us to test how combat activity changes during
a security transition, and, perhaps more importantly, to explore how public percep-
tions and attitudes are influenced by the foreign-to-local handover. This paper opens
up a new set of research questions about the industrial organization of coalitions at
war. Moreover, it raises basic questions about how transitions resolve the hazards of
jointly producing security.
Our results also suggest several actionable insights for managing international
military interventions. First, announcing a prolonged timeline for withdrawal may
19See https://nbcnews.to/39zvnwZ and https://nbcnews.to/2VjIlqa.
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create opportunities for opposition forces to strategically respond to the intervention.
In particular, insurgents may simply wait out the withdrawal – a contention that
has been frequently raised by some US politicians, and is now corroborated by our
evidence. By conserving their fighting capacity, rebels may implicitly (or explicitly)
manipulate the signals that international organizations and coalition forces receive
about the relative capabilities of local government forces. Benchmarks may or may
not be useful in a context in which rivals are “holding their punches.” This point
is made more poignant by US Defense Department assessments conducted during
the transition, which interpreted the short-run reductions in violence as evidence that
local Afghan forces were prepared for their long-term mission of providing security
after the coalition withdrawal.
Second, local force preparation should be reconsidered. Our findings suggest that
Afghan security forces were not adequately prepared for the large-scale withdrawal
of ISAF; this is the case even though the US Congress alone allocated $60.7 billion
to training and arming the Afghan security forces, including their national military
and police forces. The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
has conducted several high-profile investigations of the US effort to enhance Afghan
forces, noting “ghost” soldiers, poor training, and widespread corruption in hiring.
20 The recent declassification of the Afghanistan Papers, a compilation of retrospec-
tive interviews conducted by SIGAR, makes this point even clearer; resources were
siphoned from official projects to enrich political elites, warlords, and the Taliban. Of
the roughly 400 interviews conducted, 129 explicitly mention concerns about the role
of corruption in undermining economic growth, political stability, and security provi-
sion in Afghanistan. Corruption represents a first-order threat to successful security
transitions and sustainable state-building efforts. The handover of foreign-owned
assets (including vehicles, weaponry, ammunition, and basic supplies) was also a no-
table legal hurdle, which may have hindered the preparation of Afghan forces for
long-term security provision. Reevaluating how local forces receive training, and reg-
ularly auditing these forces may stabilize future security transitions.
Finally, future security transitions should maintain stronger data collection efforts
20See https://bit.ly/37kLED3.
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even after international forces withdraw. This study reinforces the importance of
robust, ongoing data collection and government commitments to data dissemination.
Although our survey data enable us to track public perceptions until 2016, our tactical
records effectively end earlier. The platform used to collect combat operation activity
was used less consistently after the end of the NATO mission. While we are able
to estimate the short- and medium-run consequences of the transition using these
military records, longer-term dynamics cannot be studied. The way that military
interventions end likely have profound consequences on economic development and
political stability. It is therefore imperative to continually collect and share data, even
after security transitions end, to inform future economic and policy decisions.
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7 Figures and Tables for the Main Text
Figure 1: Key dates in the transition process.
Notes: Dates of the different transition stages were obtained from the NATO publication “Inteqal:
Transition to Afghan lead.” The authors complemented the graphical timeline with auxiliary informa-
tion.
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Figure 2: Distribution of conflict intensity and assignment of districts to different tranches of the security transfer to the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
Panel A: Conflict intensity Panel B: Assignment of districts to tranches
Notes: Panel A presents the distribution of conflict events in the SIGACTS data across the country. Panel B presents the different assignments
of districts to the five different transition tranches.
Figure 3: Share of SIGACTS events involving security forces.
Notes: The figure plots the share of events per quarter by security force involvement. This measure is
based on all events (including non-combat activities). Afghan security forces (ANSF) include all armed
forces, including local and border police. Vertical lines indicate the quarter of the first and the last
transition tranches.
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Figure 4: Timing of base closure relative to district tranche announcement and travel distance to nearest retrograde
logistic hub
Panel A: Last base closure date relative to tranche date Panel B: Distance to nearest logistic hub
Notes: Panel A visually presents the variation in the timing of the base closure (“Troop withdrawal”) dates relative to the transition onset
announcements (“Security handover”). If a district is matched with several bases, the timing is determined by the date of the last recorded
base that was retrograded or handed over. Panel B presents visually the least-cost, shortest path distance between a district centroid to one of
the 10 retrograde logistic hubs used in the withdrawal operation. We assume a unit cost of crossing via paved roads; the cost of crossing via an
unpaved road occurs two units of costs per unit of distance, while crossing terrain without roads incurs a cost of 10 units. Least-cost paths are
computed used Dijkstra’s algorithm.
Figure 5: Event studies around the security transfer to Afghan National Security Forces (SIGACTS)
Events with casualties Direct fire IED explosion
Notes: Event studies around the “Security handover” to the Afghan National Security Forces, using quarterly district-level data (2008-2014).
Coefficients on “time to Security handover” are shown with 90% confidence intervals. The models are analogous to column (1) in Table 1, but
they include time-to-treatment dummies. Outcomes are subject to a Log(x+1) transformation. Regressions include district fixed effects and
regional command ˆ time fixed effects.
41









    
&RHIILFLHQWHVWLPDWHORJSRLQWV
Notes: Coefficients and 90% confidence intervals on “Security handover” in a model that is analogous
to column (2) in Table 1. Data are at the district-quarter level (2008-2014). Regressions include district
fixed effects, regional command ˆ time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. Outcomes are subject
to a Log(x+1) transformation. Full results can be found in the Online Appendix, in Table A3.
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Notes: Coefficients and 90% confidence intervals on “Troop withdrawal” in a model that is analogous
to column (1) in Table 4. Data are at the district-quarter level (2008-2014). All regressions include dis-
trict fixed effects, regional command ˆ time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The instrument
used for “Troop withdrawal” is the interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military airport
and an indicator for the post-2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport ˆ time
fixed effects, and distance to province borders ˆ time fixed effects. Outcomes are subject to a Log(x+1)
transformation. Full results can be found in the Online Appendix Table A3.
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Table 1: Security transfer to Afghan National Security Forces and conflict (SIGACTS)
Log(x+1)
All fatal events Direct fire attacks IED explosions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Security handover -0.138 -0.098 -0.134 -0.066 -0.074 -0.078
(0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029)
Mean DV 0.920 0.920 1.145 1.145 0.686 0.686
Std Dev DV 1.137 1.137 1.319 1.319 0.984 0.984
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377
District time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2014.
All regressions include district fixed effects and regional command ˆ time
fixed effects. Outcomes are subject to a Log(x+1) transformation. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.
Table 2: Security transfer to Afghan National Security Forces and perception of security (ANQAR)
Security Afghan National Security Force presence and control
Improved Taliban weaker See Afghan National Afghan National Security Taliban
security Army Monthly Forces bring security control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Security handover 0.027 0.025 0.031 0.024 -0.002
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Mean DV 0.321 0.432 0.697 0.508 0.189
Std Dev DV 0.221 0.235 0.318 0.236 0.227
Observations 8523 7835 8308 8522 8523
Number of Districts 375 375 375 375 375
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2016. All regressions include district
fixed effects, regional command ˆ time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The dependent variables mea-
sure shares of respondents at the district level. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented
in parentheses.
Table 3: Coalition troop withdrawal: first stage
Troop withdrawal
(1) (2) (3)
Travel distance to military airport ˆ Post 2011 1.728 1.898 2.007
(0.237) (0.235) (0.236)
Security handover 0.193 0.190
(0.028) (0.029)
Mean DV 0.388 0.388 0.388
Std Dev DV 0.487 0.487 0.487
F-statistic on instrument 53.325 65.292 72.141
Number of Observations 13572 13572 13572
Number of Districts 377 377 377
IV control set ˆ time FE No Yes Yes
Tranche ˆ time FE No No Yes
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-
2016. All regressions include district fixed effects, regional command ˆ
time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The additional IV control
set includes the distance to any airport and to the province border. The
dependent variable is “Troop withdrawal”, which is a binary indicator for
the last recorded base closure, retrograde, or handover at the district level.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in paren-
theses.
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Table 4: Coalition troop withdrawal and conflict (SIGACTS)
Log(x+1)
All Casualty Events Direct Fire Attacks IED Explosions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: District level – OLS
Troop withdrawal 0.003 -0.000 -0.006 0.001 -0.008 -0.008
(0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.043) (0.029) (0.031)
Security handover -0.103 -0.057 -0.094
(0.031) (0.036) (0.029)
Mean DV 0.920 0.920 1.145 1.145 0.686 0.686
Std Dev DV 1.137 1.137 1.319 1.319 0.984 0.984
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377
Tranche ˆ time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Panel B: District level – IV
Troop withdrawal 0.666 0.616 0.572 0.495 0.773 0.730
(0.308) (0.296) (0.327) (0.310) (0.305) (0.287)
Security handover -0.205 -0.146 -0.214
(0.059) (0.063) (0.062)
Mean DV 0.920 0.920 1.145 1.145 0.686 0.686
Std Dev DV 1.137 1.137 1.319 1.319 0.984 0.984
Weak IV statistic 48.751 57.882 48.751 57.882 48.751 57.882
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377
Tranche ˆ time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2014. All
regressions include district fixed effects, regional command ˆ time fixed effects,
and district-specific trends. The instrument used for “Troop withdrawal” is the
interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military airport and an indicator for
the post-2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport ˆ time
fixed effects, and distance to province borders ˆ time fixed effects. Outcomes are
subject to a Log(x+1) transformation. The weak IV statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald F-statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented
in parentheses.
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Table 5: Coalition troop withdrawal and security perceptions (ANQAR)
Security Afghan National Security Forces presence and control
Improved Taliban weaker See Afghan National Afghan National Security Taliban
security Army Monthly Forces bring security control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: District Level
Troop withdrawal -0.177 -0.205 0.160 -0.121 -0.067
(0.054) (0.056) (0.078) (0.056) (0.057)
Security handover 0.062 0.061 -0.008 0.044 0.009
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018)
Mean DV 0.321 0.432 0.697 0.508 0.189
Std Dev DV 0.221 0.235 0.318 0.236 0.227
Weak IV statistic 63.465 63.577 63.390 63.476 63.465
Observations 8523 7835 8308 8522 8523
Number of Districts 375 375 375 375 375
Panel B: District Level, Tranche ˆ time FE
Troop withdrawal -0.171 -0.184 0.132 -0.127 -0.062
(0.053) (0.055) (0.075) (0.053) (0.056)
Mean DV 0.321 0.432 0.697 0.508 0.189
Std Dev DV 0.221 0.235 0.318 0.236 0.227
Weak IV statistic 71.736 72.213 71.722 71.743 71.736
Observations 8523 7835 8308 8522 8523
Number of Districts 375 375 375 375 375
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2016. All regressions include district
fixed effects, regional command ˆ time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The instrument used for “Troop
withdrawal” is the interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military airport and an indicator for the post-
2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport ˆ time fixed effects, and distance to province
borders ˆ time fixed effects. The dependent variables measure shares of respondents at the district level. The
weak IV statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and
presented in parentheses.
Table 6: Security force activity
Improper behavior ANA needs full ANA will most likely defeat CERP spending
by ANA international support insurgents Log(x+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Troop withdrawal 0.009 0.099 -0.056 1.419
(0.092) (0.048) (0.054) (2.255)
Security handover -0.012 -0.009 0.015 -0.567
(0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.480)
Mean DV 0.156 0.243 0.380 3.502
Std Dev DV 0.195 0.191 0.229 5.359
Weak IV statistic 27.208 63.476 63.465 48.751
Observations 6486 8521 8523 10556
Number of Districts 360 375 375 377
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2016 (2008-2014 for column 4). All re-
gressions include district fixed effects, regional command ˆ time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The
instrument used for “Troop withdrawal” is the interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military airport and
an indicator for the post-2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport ˆ time fixed effects, and
distance to province borders ˆ time fixed effects. The dependent variables in columns (1)-(3) measure the share
of respondents in the ANQAR survey at the district level. Column (4) contains CERP spending, which is subject
to a Log(x+1) transformation. The CERP data include projected spending in 2014. The weak IV statistic is the
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.
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Appendix to “Security Transitions”
For Online Publication
A Spillover Controls
We bring a new spatial econometric tool to the broader conflict literature in eco-
nomics and political science, helping researchers account for latent dependency in
the spillovers of violence across space. Existing approaches require the researcher to
pre-specify the dependence structure (e.g., physical proximity) and are insufficient in
the presence of autocorrelation driven by factors unknown to the researcher (see, for
example, Berman et al., 2017; Mueller et al., 2017; Ferrara and Harari, 2018). This is
likely the case when studying conflict dynamics, where the use of violence may be
linked across locations through factors beyond physical distance. We instead extend
the framework by de Paula et al. (2019) to learn about the pattern of spillovers from
within the data itself, applying it to a context where potential biases from conflict
displacement could be significant.
We write the Equation (4) in a more concise notation by collecting the wi,j in a
N ˆ N matrix W. In our case, i represents a district; hence, wi,j is stated as wd,j in
the manuscript for ease of interpretation. Matrix W is often known as the spatial,
neighboring or adjacency matrix. We also stack the other elements to write the model
yt = a + bt + rWyt + gHandovert + dW ¨ Handovert + h ˆ t + et (A1)
where yt, a, bt, Handovert and et are, respectively, the column-vector of outcomes,
district fixed effects, regional command time trends, Handoverd,t treatment indicators
and error term, for all regions and districts at a given point in time.
A few special cases of Equation (A1) are of interest. First, if d = r = 0 there are no
spillover effects and the specification above boils down to Equation (1). Second, set-
ting only r = 0 leads to spillover specification with controls for exogenous effects. We
1
offer both the versions with r = 0 and freely estimated without restrictions, such as
typical in models of social interactions (Blume et al., 2015). It is worth also mentioning
that if either r or d are not equal to zero, than identification of the treatment effects
through the standard difference-in-differences in model (1) might be compromised
as untreated units suffer from spillovers from the treated ones, and the comparison
between treated and control no longer accounts for the treatment (transition) effects
(SUTVA violation). This is particularly relevant as, throughout the exercise, our in-
terest is in evaluating the robustness of the estimates of g with respect to alternative
formulations of the spillover effects.
The choice of the set of weights wi,j attracts particular prominence in our context
because it reflects the extent to which the insurgents are able to displace across dis-
tricts. This is the case for example, in Mueller et al. (2017), Ferrara and Harari (2018)
where wi,j depends on some inverse function of distance; or in Berman et al. (2017)
where it reflects ethnic control of mines in Africa. In turn, this would translate into
specific assumptions on the mechanism that underpins conflict displacement. This is
particularly limiting as it is not ex-ante clear how the insurgency displaces in space.
In reality, insurgent activity is potentially highly mobile, and the transition to ANSF
might have induced a strategic reallocation of insurgent activity to districts elsewhere.
Furthermore, it would be in their interest to obfuscate their displacement strategy, so
as not to make their movements predictable by the occupying forces. In such case, the
weights can hardly be assumed to be ex-ante known by the empiricist.
We both pre-specifying W according to various measures of distance and, to over-
come the issue that the patterns of spatial dispersion are not necessarily observed, we
also opt to recover it from the data. To do so, we apply the method in de Paula et al.
(2019) which allows us to fully and flexibly recover the network matrix W from the
panel data. The method provides a high-dimensional technique to deal with a large
number of parameters. Furthermore, the authors show that W and the parameters r,
g and d are globally identified. The purpose of this Section is to review and provide
an adaptation of their methodology.
The method in de Paula et al. (2019) postulates that W, r, g and d are globally iden-
tified under the assumption of the variation in the composition of reference groups
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to identify the spatial effects. Such type of assumptions which originate from the
network asymmetry have been shown to overcome the “reflection problem” as first
postulated by Manski (1993). In line with de Paula et al. (2019), we additionally re-
quire the following standard regularization conditions: (i) no district affects itself, and
so the main diagonal of W is equal to zero, Wii = 0 for every i = 1, . . . , N, ruling out a
trivial solution to the model; (ii) the row-sums of W are smaller than one in absolute
value,
∞N
j=1 |Wij| § 1 for every i = 1, . . . , N and |r| † 1, ensuring that the system of
equations is stationary in the spatial sense and the inverse of (I ´ rWyt) is well de-
fined; (iii) there is one row i such that
∞N
j=1 Wij = 1, which is a simple normalization;
and, finally, (iv) the spatial effects do not cancel each other out, rg + d ‰ 0. We apply
the method on the residualized yt and xt after projecting on the space generated by
the fixed effects. We make use of moment conditions given by the orthogonality be-
tween Handovert and the error term to formulate moment conditions gNT(q) where
the full set of structural parameters is given by q = (r, g, d, w12, . . . , wN,N´1). The first
step in the Adaptive Elastic Net GMM is the solution to


















where K is the number of parameters to be estimated, equal to N(N ´ 1) + 3, and p1
and p2 are the non-negative penalization terms. The term gNT(q)1gNT(q) is the GMM
objective criteria. The first penalization term linearly increases the objective function
for every wi,j estimated as non-zero. As the penalization increases, more elements wi,j
are estimated as zeros. The second term penalizes for the sum of the square of the
links between units. This term has been shown to provide a more stable solution to
the problem.
Finally, it has been shown that the solution to the first step alone would bias the
estimates towards zero. To alleviate this problem, the estimates from the first step are
refined in the adaptive stage,





















where typically k = 2.5, and the full set of penalization parameters (p1, p˚1, p2) is
chosen by BIC.
The results of the analysis are presented in Tables A4 and A5. The first col-
umn shows the results of Equation (A1) without spillover controls, thus equal to
the difference-in-differences and IV specifications. Columns (2)-(7) present the results
of the specification with exogenous effects and for various pre-conditioned distance
matrices W. These assume that the spillover affect neighbor districts, neighbor or
neighbor-of-neighbor districts, neighbor province, distance below 250km and 500km
and driving distance below 500km. Columns (8)-(10) apply the method in de Paula
et al. (2019), restricting the interaction of districts beyond 500km and 1000km driving
distance to zero. Column (10) includes endogenous effects. In both tables, and across
most specifications, we find that the main treatment effects – the security handover
in Table A4, and troop withdrawal in Table A5 – remain robust to the inclusion of
spillover controls.
B Distant Gridcell Pair Matching
In an attempt to relax the identification assumption that underlies our main district
level difference-in-differences approach, we change the unit of analysis to 10ˆ10 km
gridcells. The choice of 10 x 10 km gridcells is appealing as this resolution is the
basis of the geo-coordinate standard used by NATO militaries for locating points on
the earth. This is only possible for the SIGACTS data, as the ANQAR survey data
is reported at the district level. In the resulting high-resolution dataset, we construct
pairs of matched gridcells. We rely on purely geographical characteristics of gridcells
measured at baseline, such as: grid level population (as of 2008), elevation, distance
to nearest asphalt road, distance to nearest road, and distance to the nearest airport.
In addition we use land cover data and construct the share of grid cells covered by
different land cover type across sixteen land cover classes using the detailed 500m
pixel resolution MODIS product (Channan et al., 2014). We proceed by constructing
these matched pairs sequentially sampling without replacement: we first find matches
for grid cells in the first transition waves by sampling from cells in later waves, only
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retaining matched pairs that are sufficiently similar with a propensity score difference
of less than 0.001.1 Our main estimating sample is chosen such that matched pairs are
at least 200km apart (we call these distant matched pairs). This strategy allows us to
rule out displacement effects, which could affect estimates relying on close matched
pairs.
The estimating specification for the distant matched panel difference-in-differences
is as follows:
yi,p,d,t = ai + bp,t + g ˆ Handoverd,t + hd ˆ t + ei,p,d,t (A2)
As before, the level of analysis is gridcell i, that is part of a matched pair p located in
district d, and month t. We include matched-pair specific time fixed effects bp,t. These
are very demanding, as for every matched pair, we allow conflict to be on a different
trajectory common only to the cells that form the matched pair. This zooms in to any
time-varying changes that are specific to the matched-pair and accounts for any non-
linear trends specific to the propensity score. As in earlier specifications, Handoverd,t
switches on when ANSF takes over from ISAF. Since the distant matched pair panel
is very granular (both in terms of time and geography), we use dummy variables as
outcomes capturing the incidence of a conflict event within a given gridcell-month as
a more meaningful measure of conflict activity. The crucial identifying assumption
remains that there are common trends in conflict levels across observationally similar
distant matched grid cells in the different transition phases. Table A9 shows that
we achieve improved balance on conflict characteristics compared to the district level
when resorting to the distant matched pair analysis, yet, some important baseline
differences still exist. As with the district-level difference-in-differences strategy, event
studies around the transition dates (in Figure A3) and the estimation of pre-treatment
effects (in Panel B of Figure A4) provide evidence in support of the common trend
assumption. Results for the gridcell analysis are presented in Table A10, along with
event study graphs in Figure A3. The gridcell-level outcomes show reductions in
1This approach could result in a decay in match quality for later transition rounds, as the set of
available grid cells for matching becomes smaller. It turns out that the average estimated propensity
score does not systematically differ between early versus late transition rounds.
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violence that are larger although it should be kept in mind that this is at the extensive
margin of our violence outcomes.
C Supplemental discussion of mechanisms
C.1 Complementarities in war fighting
In the main text, we highlight several types of complementarities. In this section,
we expand on the discussion of the main text and link our argument to the existing
literature on insurgent tactics.
Complementarities could arise because ISAF monitors the ANSF and provides
military support after local forces take operational command. In particular, we might
expect that foreign forces would offer additional evaluation of Afghan forces (leading
to improved conduct assessments), provide additional material support in terms of
development assistance, and be marginally more likely to respond to violent events
that trigger combat support following the security handover. We could find no clear
evidence of these types of complementarities — shifts in monitoring, aid delivery, or
war fighting support (see Tables 6 and A12). In the text, we also present a brief sketch
of a distinct complementarity: an unobserved shock to state capacity occurred just
after each local transition announcement and reversed after foreign withdrawal. Here
we provide some additional context and references. A shock of this type might be a
large shift in the stock of weapons available to Afghan forces, which were depleted
by the time coalition forces exit. Another shock might be coordinated crackdowns
during the transition period, possibly boosted by the combined troop levels of ANSF
and ISAF. However, shocks of this type would have observable implications for the
levels and composition of insurgent attacks. Theoretical accounts, most importantly
Powell (2007) and Bueno de Mesquita (2013), suggest insurgents should substitute
conventional, labor-intensive combat (e.g., direct fire engagements) for guerrilla style
attacks (e.g., IEDs) when faced with capacity shocks. Empirical findings from a vari-
ety of contexts yield evidence consistent with such a tactical shift (Iyengar et al., 2011;
Wood, 2014; Wright, 2016; Vanden Eynde, 2018). In our setting, we would expect a
shock to the Taliban’s capacity to induce a downward shift in direct fire and an in-
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crease in roadside bomb deployment. We find no evidence of such a composition shift
(see Tables 1 4). Instead, conventional and guerrilla attacks each decline during the
first phase of the transition and jointly increase after the actual closure of bases. This
pattern is more consistent with a strategic choice by the Taliban to reduce all types
of violence after the transition, and to step up violence after the troop withdrawal.
Overall, we find the complementarity mechanism lacks a compelling empirical foun-
dation.
C.2 Lying Low
The central role of the simple model presented in the text is to situate the conflict
patterns we observe in a formalized framework. In this section, we introduce qual-
itative evidence regarding the information about the relative capacity of ANSF and
Taliban forces available to ISAF forces during the security transition. This evidence
addresses one of the central assumptions of our simple formalization of the lying low
mechanism: the relative capacity of Afghan combatants—ANSF and Taliban—was
uncertain during the security transition. A summary of this evidence is included in
the main text, but this section provides a more detailed discussion. We also discuss
the relevance of this mechanism in other settings.
C.2.1 Monitoring Relative Capacity
Despite significant resources allocated to monitoring and assessing ANSF forces, this
effort was hampered by several factors. Taliban troop force level estimates were very
inconsistent at a macro-scale and likely unreliable at the local level (district).2 Prior to
the security transition, Afghan military and expert estimates of Taliban troop levels
ranged from 2,000 to 40,000. Following the security transition, US military assess-
ments have suggested the Taliban maintains between 20,000 and 60,000 troops (Sopko,
2019). In 2018, a US official suggested estimating Taliban troop levels is a “fool’s er-
rand.”3 Assessing Taliban strength is also complicated by a dearth of credible intel-




force projection the Taliban could deploy in a given fighting season was challenging as
the sources of Taliban taxation were varied and difficult to monitor and assess in real
time (Buddenberg and Byrd, 2006; Peters, 2009; Mansfield, 2016). In addition to diffi-
culties in tracking Taliban strength, attrition in local security forces made force level
monitoring difficult. The Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR) ‘Lessons Learned’ assessment of the transition highlighted several important
challenges. From 2004 to 2014, attrition rates hovered between 25% and 33% (SIGAR,
2017, 81, 156). Assessing training, preparation, and armaments was even more diffi-
cult due to corruption and self-serving trainer assessments (SIGAR, 2017, 84-85, 171):
Corrupt behavior was shown to affect force strength numbers via high at-
trition rates, and to further perpetuate criminal behaviors, such as pay-for-
play schemes; the theft of fuel, supplies, and commodities; and narcotics
collusion... DOD forecasts and targets for force readiness were largely
based on the U.S. military’s capacity for recruitment and training, and not
based on battlefield performance and other factors corroding the force. Is-
sues such as ghost soldiers, corruption, and high levels of attrition were
more critical than training capacity to measure true [ANSF] capabilities.
More broadly, establishing the relative fighting capacity of ANSF and Taliban
troops at a local level was complicated by subjective force preparation standards
(SIGAR, 2017, 170). These standards—rating definition levels (RDLs)—changed dur-
ing the transition in a manner that kept assessments from being backwards compati-
ble (SIGAR, 2013, 89). At the same time, there was a shift during the transition from
evaluating battalions, which would have been over one or more districts, to brigades
(‘kandak’), which serve one or more provinces. This change, from the Commander’s
Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) to the Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report
(RASR), reduced actionable field assessments from the original 827 national army and
police units to 85 unit reports (SIGAR, 2013, 90). This “new assessment system not
only incorrectly measured [ANSF] capabilities, it masked fundamental weaknesses
in the [ANSF] institutional framework that the United States and coalition ignored
or minimized” (SIGAR, 2017, 85). These factors significantly reduced the amount of
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high quality district-specific information about local ANSF preparedness to engage
with Taliban forces available to ISAF forces (SIGAR, 2017, 171):
Because U.S. military plans for [ANSF] readiness were created in an en-
vironment of politically constrained timelines—and because these plans
consistently underestimated the resilience of the Afghan insurgency and
overestimated [ANSF] capabilities—the [ANSF] was ill-prepared to deal
with deteriorating security after the drawdown of U.S. combat forces.
C.2.2 Other Examples
The lying low mechanism we describe is plausibly relevant in a range of other con-
texts. The number of active occupations globally is substantial and is most directly
linked to this mechanism if and when foreign forces transition security assistance to
local actors. It is also relevant in non-occupation contexts where peacekeeping forces
are present and international organizations are assessing the viability of a timetable
for shifting basic functions, including policing and public goods delivery, to local
actors on one or both sides of the conflict.
The underlying signalling game is also relevant in non-counterinsurgency settings,
including the drawdown of NATO forces around the globe. As international actors
pull back, they assess the durability of political or economic institutions when con-
fronted by regional or global rivals. These rivals may strategically manipulate signals
of institutional resilience until those actors have completely withdrawn and the costs
of reconstituting alliance commitments is large.
A similar logic is present when governments develop and field anti-corruption
programs. Illicit actors, recognizing the type and duration of the government’s inter-
vention, may strategically manipulate perceptions of programming effectiveness. This
is particularly relevant if the program is a short-run trial, like a randomized controlled
field experiment, used to guide broader reforms. The corrupt network would have
an incentive to manipulate inferences by responding strategically to treatment if it is
known. This is related to the strategic response described in Cruz et al. (2020), where
mayoral candidates, aware of a field experiment in the Philippines, used vote buying
9
to offset the anticipated effects of an informational campaign about use of municipal
development funds.4
4We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting these points.
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Supplemental Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Trends in foreign military occupations and intervention terminations be-
















































Notes: annual counts of military occupations globally are noted with a solid black line; military occu-
pation terminations are noted with a dashed line. Data on occupations is drawn from Collard-Wexler
(2013).
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Figure A2: Events with casualties reported in SIGACTS over time and NATO troop
strength.
Panel A: Events with casualties Panel B: NATO troop deployments
Notes: The left figure presents the overall number of SIGACTS events with casualties for Afghan- or
Coalition forces. The right figure presents average monthly NATO and US troop deployments.
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Figure A3: Event Studies around the Security transfer to Afghan National Security Forces (SIGACTS) - Gridcell level
Events with casualties Direct Fire IED Explosion
Notes: Event studies around the “Security handover” to the Afghan National Security Forces. Coefficients on “time to Security handover” are
shown with 90% confidence intervals. The models are analogous to column (1) in Table A10, but include quarterly dummies for the time to
treatment to maintain consistency with the main analysis. The regressions include gridcell fixed effects and match pair ˆ time fixed effects.
Outcomes are measured as binary indicators.
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Figure A4: Security handover and Conflict (SIGACTS) - Placebo timing


























Notes: Coefficients and 90% confidence intervals on “Security handover” and “Security handover (4
quarters early)”. We add the forwarded “Security Handover” indicator (by 4 quarters or 12 months)
to a model that is analogous to column (1) in Table 4 for Panel A, and the corresponding specification
at the gridcell level for Panel B. In the left panel, the forwarded indicator becomes zero after the
treatment. In the right panel it remains equal to one, so that we estimate the difference between the
placebo effect and the treatment effect. The dependent variable is subject to a Log(x+1) transformation
at the district level in Panel A. The outcome is expressed as a binary indicator at the gridcell level in
Panel B. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.




















Notes: Coefficients and 90% confidence intervals on “Security handover” and “Security handover (4
quarters early)”. We add the forwarded treatment indicator (by 4 quarters) to a model that is analogous
to column (1) in Table 5. In the left panel, the forwarded indicator becomes zero after the treatment.
In the right panel it remains equal to one, so that we estimate the difference between the placebo effect
and the treatment effect. The dependent variable measures the share of respondents. Standard errors
are clustered at the district level.
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Panel A: District-quarter level, SIGACTS
All casualties 5.256 16.175 10556
Direct Fire 10.341 44.962 10556
IED Explosion 3.258 10.778 10556
Panel B: District-quarter level, ANQAR
Security improved in village in last 6 months (share) 0.321 0.221 8525
Taliban grown weaker in last 6 months (share) 0.432 0.235 7836
Seen Afghan Army at least monthly in village (share) 0.697 0.318 8310
Afghan Security Forces brings most security to area (share) 0.508 0.236 8524
Anti-government elements in control (versus govt, share) 0.189 0.227 8525
Panel C: District level
Travel distance to nearest military airport (cost units) 18442 10235 377
Notes: Observations at the district-quarter level in Panel A (2008-2014) and B (2008-2016); and
district-level level in Panel C. For ease of interpretation, we report Panel A in levels.
18
Table A2: Comparison of district level characteristics across different tranche phases
T1 T2 T2-T1 T3 T3-T2 T4 T4-T3 T5 T5-T4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Is security in your village better than 6 month ago? 0.288 0.291 0.002 0.216 -0.074 0.156 -0.060 0.138 -0.019
(0.023) (0.018) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.015) (0.022)
All casualties per capita -3.341 -3.291 0.050 0.795 4.086 -2.102 -2.897 9.844 11.946
(0.804) (1.095) (1.294) (1.087) (1.660) (1.246) (1.623) (1.951) (2.728)
Insurgent casualties per capita -1.005 -1.016 -0.011 -0.366 0.650 -0.871 -0.505 2.819 3.690
(0.227) (0.338) (0.362) (0.301) (0.425) (0.373) (0.414) (0.667) (0.922)
Security force casualties per capita -1.582 -1.509 0.074 0.724 2.233 -0.840 -1.564 4.962 5.802
(0.433) (0.582) (0.676) (0.600) (0.910) (0.688) (0.914) (0.987) (1.395)
Civilian casualties per capita -0.754 -0.767 -0.013 0.437 1.203 -0.391 -0.828 2.063 2.454
(0.199) (0.223) (0.276) (0.260) (0.381) (0.247) (0.369) (0.398) (0.531)
Direct Fire per capita -6.120 -4.156 1.964 -0.392 3.764 -4.310 -3.918 28.560 32.870
(3.922) (4.867) (6.875) (3.048) (6.414) (3.221) (3.703) (6.767) (8.616)
Indirect Fire per capita -3.540 -2.934 0.606 -0.133 2.801 0.845 0.978 14.739 13.894
(0.735) (0.858) (0.547) (0.837) (0.811) (1.285) (1.355) (2.821) (3.450)
IED Explosion per capita -3.011 -2.591 0.419 1.863 4.454 -0.107 -1.970 7.290 7.397
(0.686) (0.934) (1.052) (1.077) (1.570) (1.617) (2.114) (1.683) (2.654)
Nightlights per capita 966.713 654.563 -312.149 346.644 -307.919 -121.050 -467.694 -58.441 62.609
(360.962) (169.503) (408.304) (95.910) (209.364) (42.551) (117.045) (48.004) (56.095)
Opium Yield [HA] per capita 0.124 0.169 0.045 0.293 0.123 0.372 0.080 0.498 0.126
(0.071) (0.088) (0.100) (0.086) (0.107) (0.132) (0.148) (0.145) (0.189)
Notes: The table reports coeffients on tranche dummies (and their differences) from a district by quarter-level regression with quarter fixed effects. The district-
quarter level panel is restricted to the period before the tranche-specific security handover. As the tranche comparisons rely on cross-sectional variation, we
measure the violence outcomes in per capita levels. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.
19
Table A3: Security transfer to Afghan National Security Forces and conflict (SIGACTS) - District level additional out-
comes
Log(x+1)
All Casualty Direct Fire Attacks IED Explosions Insurgent Casualty Security Force Casualty Civilian Casualty Indirect Fire
Events Attacks Events Events Events Attacks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: District cell level – Security Transfer
Security handover -0.098 -0.066 -0.078 -0.047 -0.068 -0.023 -0.134
(0.031) (0.035) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.023) (0.032)
Mean DV 0.920 1.145 0.686 0.398 0.647 0.404 0.518
Std Dev DV 1.137 1.319 0.984 0.725 0.932 0.677 0.892
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377 377
Panel B: District level – Coalition troop withdrawal (IV)
Troop withdrawal 0.666 0.572 0.773 0.264 0.707 0.452 0.029
(0.308) (0.327) (0.305) (0.199) (0.278) (0.231) (0.244)
Security handover -0.205 -0.146 -0.214 -0.084 -0.191 -0.093 -0.142
(0.059) (0.063) (0.062) (0.039) (0.054) (0.046) (0.051)
Mean DV 0.920 1.145 0.686 0.398 0.647 0.404 0.518
Std Dev DV 1.137 1.319 0.984 0.725 0.932 0.677 0.892
Weak IV statistic 48.751 48.751 48.751 48.751 48.751 48.751 48.751
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377 377
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2014. All regressions include district fixed effects, regional command ˆ time fixed
effects, and district-specific trends. The instrument used for “Troop withdrawal” is the interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military airport and
an indicator for the post-2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport ˆ time fixed effects, and distance to province borders ˆ time fixed
effects. Outcomes are subject to a Log(x+1) transformation. The weak IV statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level and presented in parentheses.
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Table A4: Security transfer to Afghan National Security Forces and conflict (SIGACTS data) - Spillover estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Fatal Events Security handover (g) -0.098 -0.119 -0.108 -0.156 -0.098 -0.095 -0.097 -0.116 -0.138 -0.088
Log(x+1) (0.031) (0.034) (0.030) (0.032) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Exogenous effects (d) 0.051 0.043 0.146 -0.037 0.600 -0.109 0.577 0.800 0.698
(0.053) (0.064) (0.048) (0.175) (0.424) (0.199) (0.027) (0.027) (0.071)
Endogenous effects (r) 0.180
(0.256)
Direct Fire Attacks Security handover (g) -0.066 -0.046 -0.036 -0.080 -0.063 -0.065 -0.064 -0.103 -0.075 -0.072
Log(x+1) (0.035) (0.036) (0.032) (0.035) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Exogenous effects (d) -0.050 -0.130 0.035 -0.159 0.227 -0.184 0.687 1.018 0.565
(0.058) (0.069) (0.052) (0.189) (0.458) (0.215) (0.029) (0.030) (0.068)
Endogenous effects (r) 0.312
(0.156)
IED Explosions Security handover (g) -0.078 -0.098 -0.079 -0.112 -0.079 -0.079 -0.077 -0.127 -0.122 -0.078
Log(x+1) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Exogenous effects (d) 0.049 0.005 0.087 0.049 -0.213 -0.098 0.590 0.815 0.522
(0.048) (0.058) (0.043) (0.157) (0.380) (0.178) (0.026) (0.026) (0.084)
Endogenous effects (r) 0.121
(0.433)
Number of districts 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
District time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

























Edges that are supposed to be known - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 27.51% 17.35% 17.35%
Notes: Estimated from Equation (A1). Column (1): regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2014, including district and
regional command x time fixed effects. Dependent variable is expressed as Log(x+1). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented
in parentheses. Columns (2)-(7) are spatial panel regressions with spatial neighboring matrix assumed to be known and given, respectively, by
neighboring districts, neighboring district squared, neighboring provices, geodesical distance smaller than 250km and 500km and driving distance
smaller than 500km. Specifications reported in columns (8)-(10) have estimated and flexible spatial neighboring matrix, following de Paula et al.
(2019), where weights between districts with driving distance beyond 500km and 1000k are assumed to be equal to zero, which corresponds to
27.51% and 17.35% of all weights.
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Table A5: Coalition troop withdrawal and Conflict (SIGACTS data) - Spillover estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
All Fatal Events Troop withdrawal (g) 0.616 1.368 1.457 0.732 0.763 0.533 0.611 0.458 0.632 0.606
Log(x+1) (0.296) (0.476) (0.369) (0.309) (0.242) (0.244) (0.203) (0.199) (0.197) (0.175)
Exogenous effects (d) -0.980 -1.380 -0.191 -0.921 -1.612 0.239 3.897 4.653 2.416
(0.561) (0.508) (0.386) (0.846) (2.669) (1.213) (0.223) (0.221) (0.338)
Endogenous effects (r) 0.600
(0.060)
Direct Fire Attacks Troop withdrawal (g) 0.495 0.022 0.732 0.372 0.677 0.339 0.533 0.509 0.445 0.251
Log(x+1) (0.310) (0.515) (0.400) (0.335) (0.263) (0.265) (0.220) (0.214) (0.213) (0.181)
Exogenous effects (d) 0.617 -0.389 0.202 -1.147 -3.011 -1.760 5.443 5.438 2.468
(0.608) (0.550) (0.419) (0.917) (2.891) (1.314) (0.274) (0.250) (0.274)
Endogenous effects (r) 0.650
(0.050)
IED Explosions Troop withdrawal (g) 0.730 1.549 1.496 1.134 0.726 0.469 0.701 0.698 0.749 0.358
Log(x+1) (0.287) (0.428) (0.332) (0.278) (0.218) (0.220) (0.183) (0.178) (0.178) (0.152)
Exogenous effects (d) -1.068 -1.258 -0.665 0.021 -5.012 1.310 3.622 3.722 1.228
(0.505) (0.456) (0.347) (0.761) (2.399) (1.090) (0.204) (0.193) (0.235)
Endogenous effects (r) 0.768
(0.055)
Number of districts 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392
Tranche x time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

























Edges that are supposed to be known - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 27.51% 17.35% 17.35%
Notes: Estimated from Equation (A1). Column (1): regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2014, including district and
regional command x time fixed effects. Dependent variable is expressed as Log(x+1). Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented
in parentheses. Columns (2)-(7) are spatial panel regressions with spatial neighboring matrix assumed to be known and given, respectively, by
neighboring districts, neighboring district squared, neighboring provices, geodesical distance smaller than 250km and 500km and driving distance
smaller than 500km. Specifications reported in columns (8)-(10) have estimated and flexible spatial neighboring matrix, following de Paula et al.
(2019), where weights between districts with driving distance beyond 500km and 1000k are assumed to be equal to zero, which corresponds to
27.51% and 17.35% of all weights.
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Table A6: Security transfer to ANSF and conflict (SIGACTS) - Transformations
All fatal Events Direct Fire Attacks IED Explosions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Log(x+1)
Security handover -0.138 -0.098 -0.134 -0.066 -0.074 -0.078
(0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029)
Mean DV 0.920 0.920 1.145 1.145 0.686 0.686
Std Dev DV 1.137 1.137 1.319 1.319 0.984 0.984
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377
Panel B: Hyperbolic Sine transformation (asinh)
Security handover -0.177 -0.126 -0.162 -0.084 -0.094 -0.097
(0.038) (0.037) (0.042) (0.041) (0.036) (0.037)
Mean DV 1.151 1.151 1.414 1.414 0.864 0.864
Std Dev DV 1.384 1.384 1.571 1.571 1.210 1.210
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377
Panel C: Per capita violence levels (12-13 census)
Security handover -2.817 -1.131 -7.556 -2.446 -2.285 -2.064
(0.991) (0.993) (2.238) (1.925) (0.681) (0.697)
Mean DV 10.325 10.325 20.932 20.932 6.362 6.362
Std Dev DV 25.675 25.675 67.732 67.732 17.583 17.583
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377
Panel D: Per capita violence levels (remote sensing)
Security handover -2.897 -1.148 -7.619 -2.411 -2.295 -2.080
(1.008) (1.004) (2.265) (1.950) (0.686) (0.702)
Mean DV 10.380 10.380 21.096 21.096 6.374 6.374
Std Dev DV 25.818 25.818 66.078 66.078 17.520 17.520
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377
Panel E: Poisson
Security handover -0.108 -0.084 -0.198 -0.115 -0.148 -0.138
(0.093) (0.097) (0.116) (0.104) (0.083) (0.084)
Mean DV outcome 5.489 5.536 10.710 10.774 3.623 3.669
Std Dev DV 16.491 16.553 45.715 45.845 11.308 11.373
Observations 10108 10023 10192 10131 9492 9371
Number of Districts 361 360 364 363 339 336
District time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2014.
All regressions include district fixed effects and regional command ˆ time fixed
effects. The dependent variable is subject to the transformation specified in
each panel. Panels A-D are estimated with OLS, panel E is based on a Poisson
model. The number of observations (and districts) in the Poisson model does
not include observations that are absorbed by the model parameters. Standard
errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses.
Table A7: Security transfer to ANSF and conflict (SIGACTS) - Transformations, drop-
ping the 3 most violent districts
All fatal Events Direct Fire Attacks IED Explosions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Log(x+1)
Security handover -0.144 -0.103 -0.141 -0.073 -0.078 -0.081
(0.032) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030)
Mean DV 0.892 0.892 1.111 1.111 0.659 0.659
Std Dev DV 1.095 1.095 1.265 1.265 0.938 0.938
Observations 10472 10472 10472 10472 10472 10472
Number of Districts 374 374 374 374 374 374
Panel B: Hyperbolic Sine transformation (asinh)
Security handover -0.183 -0.131 -0.169 -0.091 -0.098 -0.100
(0.039) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.037) (0.037)
Mean DV 1.119 1.119 1.377 1.377 0.833 0.833
Std Dev DV 1.342 1.342 1.518 1.518 1.163 1.163
Observations 10472 10472 10472 10472 10472 10472
Number of Districts 374 374 374 374 374 374
Panel D: Per capita violence levels (12-13 census)
Security handover -3.227 -1.706 -7.648 -2.943 -2.296 -2.158
(0.909) (0.851) (2.028) (1.739) (0.651) (0.669)
Mean DV 9.295 9.295 18.054 18.054 5.706 5.706
Std Dev DV 20.844 20.844 51.036 51.036 15.023 15.023
Observations 10472 10472 10472 10472 10472 10472
Number of Districts 374 374 374 374 374 374
Panel E: Per capita violence levels (remote sensing)
Security handover -3.312 -1.766 -7.871 -3.008 -2.328 -2.198
(0.920) (0.855) (2.091) (1.771) (0.659) (0.676)
Mean DV 9.388 9.388 18.428 18.428 5.745 5.745
Std Dev DV 21.166 21.166 52.894 52.894 15.179 15.179
Observations 10472 10472 10472 10472 10472 10472
Number of Districts 374 374 374 374 374 374
Panel E: Poisson
Security handover -0.164 -0.161 -0.175 -0.125 -0.163 -0.178
(0.080) (0.069) (0.103) (0.077) (0.079) (0.066)
Mean DV outcome 4.590 4.629 8.178 8.228 3.003 3.042
Std Dev DV 11.198 11.237 23.994 24.058 7.801 7.844
Observations 10024 9939 10108 10047 9408 9287
Number of Districts 358 357 361 360 336 333
District time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2014.
The three outlying districts that are removed in these samples experienced
more than 2,000 casualty events in the sample period. All regressions include
district fixed effects and regional command ˆ time fixed effects. The dependent
variable is subject to the transformation specified in each panel. Panels A-D
are estimated with OLS, panel E is based on a Poisson model. The number of
observations (and districts) in the Poisson model does not include observations
that are absorbed by the model parameters. Standard errors clustered at the
district level and are presented in parentheses.
Table A8: Summary Statistics at the gridcell level
Mean Standard Deviation N
(1) (2) (3)
Gridcell-month level
All casualties 0.135 1.018 107016
Direct Fire 0.284 2.993 107016
IED Explosion 0.086 0.685 107016
Notes: Observations at the gridcell-month level (2008-
2014).
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Table A9: Comparison of characteristics between matched geographically similar distantly located gridcells
T1 T2 T2-T1 T3 T3-T2 T4 T4-T3 T5 T5-T4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Any All casualties 0.043 0.016 -0.026 0.040 -0.003 0.026 -0.017 0.102 0.060
(0.024) (0.007) (0.025) (0.008) (0.025) (0.006) (0.025) (0.018) (0.030)
Any Insurgent casualties 0.012 0.007 -0.006 0.013 0.001 0.009 -0.003 0.041 0.029
(0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
Any Security Force casualties 0.023 0.012 -0.012 0.028 0.005 0.015 -0.008 0.074 0.051
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.004) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
Any Civilian casualties 0.014 0.008 -0.006 0.016 0.002 0.008 -0.006 0.041 0.027
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
Any Direct Fire 0.042 0.022 -0.020 0.057 0.015 0.041 -0.001 0.128 0.086
(0.027) (0.009) (0.028) (0.011) (0.029) (0.011) (0.029) (0.022) (0.034)
Any Indirect Fire 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.026 0.018 0.009 0.000 0.065 0.057
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015)
Any IED Explosion 0.036 0.014 -0.021 0.038 0.003 0.020 -0.016 0.098 0.063
(0.020) (0.006) (0.021) (0.009) (0.021) (0.005) (0.020) (0.018) (0.027)
Any Nightlights 0.139 0.073 -0.066 0.063 -0.077 0.009 -0.131 0.062 -0.078
(0.068) (0.014) (0.070) (0.014) (0.070) (0.005) (0.068) (0.017) (0.070)
Notes: The table reports coeffients on tranche dummies (and their differences) from a gridcell by month level regres-
sion with month fixed effects. The panel is restricted to gridcell-months before the tranche-specific security transition.
Standard errors clustered at the district level and are presented in parentheses.
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Table A10: Security transfer to Afghan National Security Forces and conflict
(SIGACTS) - Gridcell Level
Dummy indicators
All fatal Events Direct Fire Attacks IED Explosions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Security handover -0.021 -0.009 -0.018 -0.006 -0.016 -0.011
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Mean DV 0.050 0.050 0.064 0.064 0.039 0.039
Observations 107016 107016 107016 107016 107016 107016
Number of Grid Cells 1274 1274 1274 1274 1274 1274
District time trend No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Regressions at the gridcell-month level, covering the period 2008-2014. All
regressions include gridcell fixed effects and match pair ˆ time fixed effects. The
dependent variable is expressed as a binary indicator variable. Standard errors
are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.
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Table A11: Main results by tranche
Log(x+1)
All Casualty Events Direct Fire Attacks IED Explosions
(1) (2) (3)
District Level (IV)
Troop withdrawal 0.683 0.533 0.735
(0.293) (0.304) (0.281)
Security handover Tranche 1 -0.482 -0.330 -0.533
(0.196) (0.231) (0.179)
Security handover Tranche 2 -0.139 -0.136 -0.209
(0.085) (0.091) (0.083)
Security handover Tranche 3 -0.100 -0.014 -0.096
(0.064) (0.073) (0.062)
Security handover Tranche 4 -0.381 -0.396 -0.287
(0.083) (0.101) (0.091)
Security handover Tranche 5 -0.156 -0.026 -0.166
(0.112) (0.136) (0.108)
Mean DV 0.920 1.145 0.686
Std Dev DV 1.137 1.319 0.984
Weak IV statistic 65.038 65.038 65.038
Observations 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level covering the period 2008-2014. All regres-
sions include district fixed effects and regional command ˆ time fixed effects, and district-
specific trends. The instrument used for “Troop withdrawal” is the interaction of the travel
distance to the nearest military airport and an indicator for the post-2011 period. The IV
control set includes distance to any airport ˆ time fixed effects, and distance to province
borders ˆ time fixed effects. Outcomes are subject to a Log(x+1) transformation. The weak
IV statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level and presented in parentheses.
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Table A12: Military Support
Log(x+1)
Close air support Medevacs IED Explosives
Found & Cleared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Troop withdrawal -0.069 -0.004 0.395 0.535 -0.165 -0.107
(0.121) (0.148) (0.216) (0.192) (0.230) (0.221)
Security handover 0.014 -0.003 -0.083
(0.043) (0.043) (0.058)
log(Direct Fire) 0.094 0.114 0.065 0.106
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.013)
Troop withdrawal=1 ˆ log(Direct Fire) -0.098 -0.207
(0.076) (0.067)
Security handover=1 ˆ log(Direct Fire) -0.010 -0.016
(0.039) (0.034)
log(IED Explosion) 0.364 0.414
(0.019) (0.023)
Troop withdrawal=1 ˆ log(IED Explosion) -0.319
(0.168)
Security handover=1 ˆ log(IED Explosion) -0.006
(0.065)
Mean DV 0.176 0.176 0.134 0.134 0.674 0.674
Std Dev DV 0.486 0.486 0.465 0.465 1.024 1.024
Weak IV statistic 51.575 25.758 51.575 25.758 51.802 25.420
Observations 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556 10556
Number of Districts 377 377 377 377 377 377
Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008-2014.All regressions include
district fixed effects, regional command ˆ time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The instru-
ment used for “Troop withdrawal” is the interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military
airport and an indicator for the post-2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport
ˆ time fixed effects, and distance to province borders ˆ time fixed effects. Outcomes are subject to a
Log(x+1) transformation. ”Medevacs” stands for ”Medical Evacuations”. The weak IV statistic is the
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented
in parentheses.
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